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BANKRUPTCY AND THE MODIFICATION OF
SUPPORT: FRESH START, HEAD START,
OR FALSE START?
SHERYL L. SCHEIBLE*
The dischargeability in bankruptcy of debts arising from dissolu-
tion of a marriage depends on whether the debts are "in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support. " Debts so characterized are not dis-
chargeable. Unfortunately, the nature of marital debts is not always
clear. While Congress has charged the federal courts with the task of
determining the dischargeability of marital debts, it has failed to estab-
lish whether the debt's nature attaches irrevocably at the time of divorce,
or whether dischargeability depends on circumstances exisiting at the
time of bankruptcy. If a federal court considers the parties'present cir-
cumstances in discharging all or a portion of a marital debt, the result,
in effect, is a modification of a state court order and a usurpation of the
state courts' traditional role in modifying support obligations.
In this Article, Professor Sheryl Scheible examines the interplay of
divorce and bankruptcy, first outlining state law principles of support
obligations and their modification, and then analyzing the bankruptcy
courts' approaches to the dischargeability of marital debts. After exam-
ining the effect of a former spouse's bankruptcy on subsequent state
court modification actions, Professor Scheible concludes that bankruptcy
courts should abstain from determining the nature of disputed marital
debts and defer to the more appropriate state court forum
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy and divorce are legal events that have become increasingly
common features of American life.1 Both proceedings are expensive, not only in
financial terms, but in emotional cost as well. Although either bankruptcy or
divorce can afford the participants an apparent "fresh start," the interplay be-
tween the two events may make such a "fresh start" quite illusory. Similarly,
the unpredictability of the relationship between state divorce law and federal
bankruptcy law may result in one of the former spouses acquiring an unfair
advantage at the other's expense in the event of a bankruptcy.
* Visiting Associate Professor, The University of North Carolina School of Law; Associate
Professor, The University of New Mexico School of Law; A.B., 1977, J.D., 1980, The University of
North Carolina; L.L.M., 1982, Yale.
1. Data collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reveals that in 1988, 594,567
bankruptcy petitions were filed and 815,497 were pending. Statistics compiled by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, from the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics indi-
cate that during that same year, 1,183,000 divorces were granted in the United States. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIrrED STATES: 1990,
at 86, 532 (110th ed. 1990); see also Schiffer, The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: Its Implications for
Family Law Practitioners, 19 J. FAM. L. 1, 3 (1980-81) (citing statistics on bankruptcy).
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Divorce can be financially devastating. Moreover, rather than severing the
parties' economic relationship, divorce frequently results in the creation of vari-
ous types of post-marital financial obligations. 2 A former spouse may be re-
quired, by court order or by contract, to pay support for the other spouse or
their children or both; division of marital assets may require one former spouse
to reimburse the other through a series of payments; one spouse may become
obligated to pay third parties for debts incurred during the marriage. 3 Not un-
commonly, the parties' post-marital fiscal predicament may be worse than it was
during marriage.
Bankruptcy and divorce are frequently interrelated.4 Financial difficulties
that lead to bankruptcy may contribute to the dissolution of marriage; similarly,
the cost of divorce and its consequences may force one or both former spouses
into bankruptcy within a short time after the marital break-up. 5 Just as the
divorce action involves both spouses and their children, a bankruptcy action not
only affects the individual debtor, but also may have an impact on the debtor's
former spouse and children, who suddenly may find that certain marital debts
established by the divorce decree are nullified by the debtor's discharge in bank-
ruptcy. 6 Furthermore, if the bankrupt spouse is discharged from liability on
debts owed to third party creditors, which were assigned to the debtor in the
divorce action, the nonbankrupt spouse may become directly responsible for re-
payment of those debts.7
2. The term "marital debts" generally will be applied in this Article to refer to payments owed
to one spouse by the other as an incident of divorce, whether the obligation is support, property
division, or another type of award, including an assumption of indebtedness owed to a third party.
3. Debts incurred during marriage often exceed a couple's net assets. On occasion, because of
generosity, guilt, or a desire to expedite the divorce, a'spouse may assume marital debts that greatly
exceed his or her ability to pay. Similarly, a spouse might exchange financial rights for a more
favorable custody arrangement. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 964 (1979).
4. See Schiffer, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 42 (1973) (citing R. Hermann, Causal
Factors in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Case Study, Institute of Gov't Affairs Occasional Paper No. 6,
Univ. of Calif., Davis, at 29 (1965), which indicated that one-third of the parties in bankruptcy
proceedings had been divorced within the previous or following year); see, e.g., Catlett v. Jackson (In
re Jackson), 58 Bankr. 72 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (husband filed for bankruptcy two weeks after
divorce); Loyko v. Loyko, 200 N.J. Super. 152, 490 A.2d 802 (1985) (husband filed for bankruptcy
four months after divorce); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 144 Vt. 549, 481 A.2d 1044 (1984) (husband
filed for bankruptcy one month after divorce).
6. Although, theoretically, spousal support and child support are distinct concepts, as a prac-
tical matter the distinction frequently is blurred, and awards for spousal support often are interre-
lated and blended with child support. Although child support is ordered for the benefit of the
children, it is administered by the custodial spouse. One court noted, "[a]s an observation on reality,
however, there are no doubt cases where a mother uses child support for her own benefit to the
disadvantage of the children, and, having that in mind, a trial judge sometimes looks with skepticism
at some claims for child support and becomes wary." Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 777 (Wyo.
1986). Characterizing the nature of an obligation for child support for bankruptcy purposes gener-
ally is not a complicated determination. See White, Strange Bedfellows: The Uneasy Alliance Be-
tween Bankruptcy and Family Law, 17 N.M.L. REv. 1, 28 (1987). Therefore, this Article focuses
primarily on spousal support and refers to child support only to the extent that it relates to spousal
support.
7. When a pre-existing marital debt owed to a third party is assigned to or is assumed by one
of the spouses upon divorce, two related but distinct debts actually exist at the time of bankruptcy:
one owed to the third party creditor and one owed to the spouse. See Long v. Calhoun (In re
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Bankruptcy law has long struggled to find a balance between affording a
debtor a fresh start on the one hand, and protecting the debtor's family members
on the other.8 Marital debts that a bankruptcy court determines are "in the
nature of alimony, maintenance or support" are nondischargeable pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Code;9 thus, the debtor's obligation with respect to those sup-
Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983). The first, the original debt owed jointly by both
spouses to a third party, will not be affected by the assignment or assumption, absent the unlikely
event of a release from liability by the creditor granted to one of the spouses. The second type of
debt is a promise by one spouse to the other, or indemnification, that the former will pay the debt.
Typically, that promise is made in conjunction with an express or implied hold-harmless provision.
Bankruptcy discharge generally relieves the debtor of direct liability to the third party creditor. If
the debtor is not discharged with respect to the second debt, the promise to the spouse, the discharge
may be virtually meaningless. Although the creditor could not seek recourse from the bankrupt
spouse, the creditor could collect from the nonbankrupt spouse, who in turn could proceed against
the debtor on the basis of his nondischarged hold-harmless agreement. If, however, the debtor is
discharged of both the debt to the creditor and the secondary obligation to the former spouse, the
former spouse would become directly and primarily liable to the third party creditor. See Scheible,
Defining "Support" Under Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization of the "Necessaries" Doctrine, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 41-46 (1988) (analysis of bankruptcy law regarding discharge of marital debts owed to
third parties); see also Robbins, The Advantages of a Timely Bankruptcy, FAId. ADvoc., Winter
1983, 14-16, 41-42 (generally discussing bankruptcy in family context); Schiffer, supra note 1, at 9
(effect on one former spouse's bankruptcy on nondebtor former spouse). See generally Annotation,
Debts for Alimony, Maintenance, and Support as Exceptions to Bankruptcy Discharge, Under
§ 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C § 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. FED. 403 (1984 & Supp.
1990).
8. See generally Brown, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Alimony, Maintenance and Support
Obligations: The Approach in the Sixth Circuit, 56 TENN. L. REv. 507 (1989); Fibich & Floyd,
Impact of Bankruptcy on Family Law, 29 S. TEx. L.J. 637 (1988); Freeburger & Bowles, What
Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh Away: A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital
Support Obligations, 24 J. FAM. L. 587 (1985-86); Hoffman & Murray, Obligations That Cannot Be
Erased, FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1983, at 18; Luster, Alimony and Child Support: Are They Discharge-
able in Bankruptcy in the Fifth Circuit?, 58 Miss. L.J. 155 (1988); Ravin & Rosen, The Dis-
chargeability in Bankruptcy ofAlimony, Maintenance and Support Obligations, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
1 (1986); Scheible, supra note 7; Schiffer, supra note 1; Staggs, Bankruptcy After Divorce: Rights and
Liabilities of Former Spouses in Texas, 23 S. TEx. LJ. 173 (1982); Swann, Dischargeability of Domes-
tic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1976); Tucker, The Treatment of Spousal and
Support Obligations Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 45 Tax. B.J. 1359 (1982);
Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: The Bankruptcy Court's Role in Determining
Nondischargeability of Obligations Owed to a Former Spouse, 18 U.C.C. LJ. 272 (1986); White, supra
note 6; White, Spousal and Child Support Payment Provisions in Chapter 13 Plans, 16 CAP. U.L.
REv. 369 (1987) [hereinafter White, Spousal and Child Support]; Comment, Alimony and Child
Support: Are They Dischargeable in Bankruptcy in the Fifth Circuit?, 58 Miss. L.J. 155 (1988) [here-
inafter Comment, Alimony and Child Support]; Comment, Dissolution of Marriage After Discharge in
Bankruptcy: The Not-So-Fresh Start Doctrine, 10 PAc. L.J. 861 (1979); Comment, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: Dischargeability of Obligations Incurred Under Property Settlements, Separation
Agreements, and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 520 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act]; Comment, Putative Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25
UCLA L. REV. 96 (1977); Note, Discharge of Post-Marital Support Obligations Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1981) (authored by Mark P. Munson) [hereinafter Mun-
son Note]; Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten,
52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977); Note, The Effect of the Indiana Divorce Law upon the Application of Section
17a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 12 IND. L. REv. 379 (1979); Note, Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of
Divorce Related Expenses Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), 35 OKLA. L. REV. 799 (1982).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988) provides an exception from discharge for debts
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or
support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territo-
rial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent
that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise
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port10 debts continues despite the bankruptcy action.11 However, marital debts
that are not deemed to constitute support are regarded as property division and,
thus, are dischargeable; therefore, those debts are extinguished by the bank-
ruptcy action and are no longer enforceable through the divorce decree or by
other means. 12 Unfortunately, it is not always clear which debts are "in the
nature of support."
Congress clearly indicated that, in determining the dischargeability of mari-
tal debts in bankruptcy, federal law, not state law, must dictate the characteriza-
tion of the debt as "support" or "property division." 13 Congress failed,
however, to clarify whether the debt's nature attaches irrevocably at the incep-
tion of the debt at the time of the parties' divorce, or whether that nature de-
pends on the circumstances existing at the time of bankruptcy.
Currently, the federal courts are divided as to whether present circum-
stances are relevant to determining dischargeability of marital debts. A majority
of federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that if a
debt had the necessary features of support at its inception, then the obligation
retains that character for bankruptcy purposes and may not be discharged. 14
Conversely, a minority position, advanced primarily by the Sixth Circuit, 15
adopts the view that at least a limited inquiry into the parties' circumstances at
the time of bankruptcy is necessary to categorize accurately certain types of
marital debts. Under this "present circumstances" approach, a debt that
originated as support may have become unreasonable over time and lost the
characteristic of support; hence, the debt will be totally or partially discharged.
Application of a present circumstances test has serious implications because
of its potential to transform all or a portion of an otherwise nondischargeable
support debt into a debt that is dischargeable. Such a transformation or
recharacterization by the bankruptcy court essentially constitutes a modification
or (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support,
unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
10. For bankruptcy purposes, the courts rarely distinguish between the terms "alimony,"
"maintenance," or "support" when referring to obligations to a former spouse, but, instead, use the
terms interchangeably. See Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 F.2d 874, 876 n.1 (10th Cir. 1986).
But see Crist v. Crist (In re Crist), 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S.
986, 454 U.S. 819 (1981). As used in this Article, the word "support" generally will be applied to
refer to the type of marital debt that is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5).
11. Bankruptcy law gives preferential treatment to alimony, maintenance, and support in other
contexts. For example, such payments constitute exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(D)
(1988) and collection of those debts is not affected by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.
12. Section 524 of title 11 releases the debtor from further liability on a discharged debt and
prohibits the creditor from attempting to enforce the debt. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988). See White, supra
note 6, for a detailed description of a bankruptcy action.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONa. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6320; see infra note 211 and accompanying text.
14. Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), No. 90-3258 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, USAPP file); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick
v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986);
Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1985); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d
681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984).
15. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 (6th Cir. 1983); infra notes 142-
65 and accompanying text.
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of a state court support order. Both the creation and modification of support
obligations, in turn, traditionally have been regarded as exclusively a function of
the state courts. 16 The crux of the controversy, therefore, is whether the bank-
ruptcy courts should usurp the state courts' interest by determining modification
issues.
The overlay of federal law onto state law regarding modification produces a
variety of complications and potential inequities. Although state courts vary
with respect to the appropriate criteria for modification, they generally consider
traditional forms of alimony and child support to be modifiable if the parties'
relative financial circumstances or needs change substantially following the di-
vorce. 1 7 Thus, the bankruptcy of either former spouse may alter the parties'
financial conditions sufficiently to justify a state court modification action.18
Consequently, the bankruptcy action may drive the parties back into state court
to seek a modification of the divorce decree, in an attempt to reestablish a bal-
ance of the parties' post-divorce financial relationship that was disrupted by the
bankruptcy action.
Whether a specific debt is modifiable by a state court depends largely on
how the debt originally was structured. 19 Because not all types of marital obli-
gations are modifiable under state law, a state court may be powerless to allevi-
ate the effects of bankruptcy. Therefore, if a bankruptcy court refuses to
consider present circumstances in classifying a debt, the debtor may be burdened
with an unreasonable or inequitable debt, frustrating the underlying fresh start
policy of bankruptcy law. Conversely, state family law principles may preclude
the debtor's dependents from securing a remedy when the obligor's discharge of
marital debts in bankruptcy has affected adversely their own financial situation.
In either case, inequity may occur as the consequence of a former spouse's
bankruptcy. The interrelationship between bankruptcy and modification of
marital debts must be reevaluated to strike an appropriate balance between two
competing policies, providing the debtor with an economic fresh start on the one
hand, and protecting a debtor's dependents by preventing him from gaining an
unfair head start on the other.
This Article analyzes the interplay of bankruptcy and support modification.
Part II outlines the principles of spousal support obligations and their modifica-
tion under state family law. Part III analyzes the development and rejection of a
present circumstances test by the bankruptcy courts. The state courts' reaction
to bankruptcy in modification actions is examined in Part IV. Finally, Part V
suggests an integrated approach to the modification problem, recommending an
active role by both state and federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings that in-
volve marital debts.
16. See, e.g., Chedrick v. Chedrick (In re Chedrick), 98 Bankr. 731, 734 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989); Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 94 Bankr. 355, 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Levy v. Levy
(In re Levy), 63 Bankr. 449, 451 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986).
17. See infra notes 3747 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 254-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
II. STATE LAW PRINCIPLES OF SUPPORT
A. Traditional Alimony as Support
Traditional alimony awards, though not as common today as in previous
decades,2 0 have several characteristics that make them relatively easy to identify
for bankruptcy classification purposes. First, they derive from the duty of
spousal support. Second, because of that underlying origin, they are generally
payable periodically for an indefinite period of time. Finally, state courts have
regarded provisions for future installments of traditional alimony as modifiable
under appropriate circumstances.
The duty to support a spouse is perhaps the most important legal conse-
quence of marriage. 21 That duty requires a spouse to provide housing, food,
clothing, medical care, and other necessities for the marital partner.22 Until
quite recently, the duty of support was imposed solely on the husband, for the
benefit of the wife.23 Largely as a result of the women's movement and equal
protection claims based on gender discrimination, 24 today the obligation is
mutual.25
While a marriage is intact, the courts rarely dictate the extent of the duty of
support; rather, the spouses themselves must determine the family's standard of
living.2 6 In extreme circumstances, the general practice of noninterference is
20. See McGraw, Sterin & Davis, A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J.
FAM. L. 443, 473 (1981-82) (indicating a significant decline in alimony awards); Weitzman, The
Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1221 (1981) (noting that approximately 18% of divorcing women
are awarded alimony).
21. The duty to support one's children exists regardless of the parents' marital status. See H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 176-77, 200 (2d ed. 1988); H.
KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (1981); Krause, Child Sup-
port Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367,
384-85.
22. The duty of support arises solely from the marital relationship and does not attach to un-
married cohabitation. See H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 250. The extent of the duty is generally
defined with respect to the parties' standard of living or in accordance with "station in life." Id. at
251. For discussions of the duty of spousal support, see Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Mar-
riage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 559-84
(1974); Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REV. 709, 710-
32 (1956); Note, Support of the Wife: Statutory Rights and Remedies, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 108,
108-27 (1961).
23. Historically, the husband had the duty to support his wife, who in turn had a duty to
provide household services. Today each spouse has a legal duty to support the other. H. CLARK,
supra note 21, at 250-51.
24. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (state statute authorizing alimony for wives but
not husbands violates equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); see also H. CLARK,
supra note 21, at 251 (duty of support must rest equally on both spouses to be constitutional).
25. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-37 (West
1986); UNIF. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT, 9 (Part 1) U.L.A. 333 (1988) (adopted by Califor-
nia, Maine, New Hampshire, and Utah). As a practical matter, the husband generally still remains
the primary source of support. See Bianchi, Wives Who Earn More Than Their Husbands, AMERI-
CAN DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1984, at 9, cited in I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ, & A. STANTON, FAMILY
LAW 269 (1986).
26. See, eg., Shilling v. Shilling, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (physical
or financial separation necessary for alimony or child support); McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226,
238, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1953).
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tempered by family expense statutes,27 criminal nonsupport laws,28 and to some
extent, the necessaries doctrine. 2 9 Once the marriage breaks down, however, the
courts will intervene and define the support obligation in precise terms. 30 Ali-
mony has been the traditional vehicle for continuing the duty of support owed to
a dependent spouse once the couple's legal relationship has terminated.
Historically, courts awarded alimony to a wife when they granted her a
divorce because of the husband's marital fault. 31 In addition to its punitive as-
pects, alimony was intended to provide a means of support to the former wife
who, through no offense of her own, was unable to support herself as a single
person.
3 2
27. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5120.130, 5120.140 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 209, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.05 (West 1990).
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.04 (West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1101
(Smith-Hurd 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANm. § 28.358 (West 1990); MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.5
(1974).
29. The doctrine of necessaries protected wives from nonsupport by creating liability in the
husband to third parties who furnished the wife basic goods and services when her husband failed to
do so himself. The necessaries doctrine applied to children and their fathers as well. See H. CLARK,
supra note 21, at 265-66; I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ, & A. STANTON, FAMILY LANN 97-98 (1986). The
extent of the doctrine depended on the family's standard of living and the husband's means and,
therefore, was not limited to bare essentials. See Long v. Carter, 39 N.M. 255, 255, 44 P.2d 1040,
1040 (1935); State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 536-39, 563 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (1977). The husband
incurred no liability if a third party gratuitously furnished goods or services to the wife, if the hus-
band had already supplied necessaries, or if the wife had abandoned the husband. I. ELLMAN, P.
KURTZ, & A. STANTON, supra, at 97-98. Although the common law only applied the necessaries
doctrine to husbands, most states now have extended it to both spouses. See Jersey Shore Medical
Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 151-52, 417 A.2d 1003, IC08-09 (1980); Rich-
land Memorial Hosp. v. Burton, 282 S.C. 159, 161, 318 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1984). At least one state
regards the husband as primarily liable, with the wife only secondarily liable. See Marshfield Clinic
v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d S36, 508-09, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1982); In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis.
2d 136, 144, 299 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1980); see also Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage:
Equal Protection, Spousal Support and the Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAM. L. 221, 237-61 (1983-
84) (traditional doctrine of necessaries wherein only the husband was held responsible for spousal
support is expanded to a reciprocal duty of spousal support by equal protection mandate); Scheible,
supra note 7, at 8-12 (discussing doctrine of necessaries and alimony); Comment, The New Doctrine
of Necessaries in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 317, 322-31 (1985) (discussing alternatives to doc-
trine of necessaries in light of the Virginia Supreme Court holding that it violated equal protection);
Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1774-80 (1984) (discussing
the modern necessaries doctrine and its flaws); Annotation, Necessity, in Action Against Husbandfor
Necessaries Furnished Wife, of Proving Husband's Failure to Provide Necessaries, 19 A.L.R.4th 432
(1983) (discussing creditor's burden of proof in action against the husband for payment of neces-
saries furnished to wife).
30. Even in the absence of an absolute divorce, courts will order support in other types of the
family dissolutions, for example, actions pendente lite and legal separations or divorces from bed and
board. See W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1119-20
(2d ed. 1990).
31. Traditionally, alimony was used to punish a husband who caused the marriage to fail; a
wife was denied alimony if she was at fault. See Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208,
216, 106 P.2d 437, 442 (1940) (wife who is guilty of immoral or unsocial conduct or who unreasona-
bly refuses to conform to husband's place or mode of living barred from alimony under then-existing
statute); Martin v. Martin, 366 So. 2d 475, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (alimony was properly
reduced due to wife's extramarital affair); cases collected in Annotation, Allowance of Permanent
Alimony to Wife Against Whom Divorce is Granted, 34 A.L.R.2d 313, 321 (1954 & Supp. 1989); see
also H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 496-528 (discussion of fault grounds and defenses).
32. Historically, a woman's economic prospects depended almost entirely on marriage. See
Bartke & Zurvalec, The Low, Middle and High Road to Marital Property Law Reform in Common
Law Jurisdictions, 7 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 200, 202-03 (1980); Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony
Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 146-47 (1980); Comment, The
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Today, alimony, like the underlying duty of marital support, has become
gender-neutral.33 If a spouse is eligible for alimony, the amount of alimony
awarded is calculated by balancing the dependent spouse's needs against the
supporting spouse's ability to pay, in view of the standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. 34 The amount of alimony awarded in an individual case is left
Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269,
1272-76 (1981). In addition to safeguarding dependent wives, alimony benefited society as a whole
by assuring that former wives would not become public charges. See Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d
1085, 1092 (D.C. 1980); Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 13 (D.C. 1977).
33. The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional state statutes that allowed only
wives, but not husbands, to obtain alimony. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). Most states'
alimony statutes now are framed in gender-neutral terms. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West
Supp. 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25.103 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (1986 & Supp. 1990). In
practice, most alimony still is awarded to wives. Munson Note, supra note 8, at 177.
34. Some states require a spouse seeking alimony to satisfy a threshold eligibility requirement
before the form or amount of an award is considered. Section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act is typical:
(a) [Tihe court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse, only if it finds that the
spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of
a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors
including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital prop-
erty apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and the extent to
which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that
party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking mainte-
nance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 347-48 (1987); see eg. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-114 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1990); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552 (West
1990). Statutes in some jurisdictions are less explicit, and simply authorize the trial court, for in-
stance, to grant alimony "in such amounts as the circumstances render necessary," N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50.16.5 (1987), or "as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may be
just." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Common factors considered in awarding
alimony include the age, health, education, and work skills of the dependent spouse; the value and
income-producing capacity of his or her separate property; that person's role as custodian of minor
children; and contributions to the marriage. See H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 644-49. Ability to pay
is measured not only in terms of actual earnings and assets, but in some instances, earning potential
if the supporting spouse deliberately depresses his income. See, eg., In re Marriage of McCarthy,
533 P.2d 928, 928 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (not released for official publication); In re Marriage of
Smith, 77 ll. App. 3d 858, 864, 396 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979). Marital fault continues to play a role in
alimony awards in a significant, although diminishing, number of states. See, e.g., Mees v. Mees, 325
N.W.2d 207, 208 (N.D. 1982); Mahne v. Mahne, 147 N.J. Super. 326, 329, 371 A.2d 314, 315
(1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Supp. 1990) (adultery may be considered); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (conduct of parties during marriage may be
considered).
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essentially to the discretion of the trial judge.35
Sometimes alimony is ordered as a lump sum, payable in money or prop-
erty, or in installment payments for a fixed period.3 6 However, because alimony
is a continuation of the duty of support, the amount of which may fluctuate over
time, the courts typically favor "periodic" or "permanent" alimony, payable at
intervals over an indefinite time period.3 7 If either party dies, the support obli-
gation usually ends and alimony terminates.38 Similarly, if the alimony recipi-
ent remarries, thus securing a new source of support, the alimony obligation of
the former spouse generally ends.39
Correspondingly, if the balance of need and ability to pay fluctuates signifi-
cantly over time, the court may modify or terminate the amount of periodic
35. See, eg., Clark v. Clark, 236 Kan. 703, 707-08, 696 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1985); Quick v. Quick,
305 N.C. 446, 453, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391,
395 (1982).
36. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 279 S.C. 454, 456-57, 309 S.E.2d 14, 15 (1983) (factors to be
considered in ordering lump sum alimony); H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 653-54 (noting that addi-
tional forms are possible and that individual states have different preferences with respect to the
form of alimony). Alimony and child support are sometimes combined; an undifferentiated sum was
structured to provide favorable tax consequences prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, although
such treatment is more difficult to obtain since that legislation. See DuCanto, The Strange and
Untimely Death of Lester, 63 TAxES 9, 11-13 (1985).
37. See, eg., Green v. Green, 41 IU. App. 3d 154, 162, 354 N.E.2d 661, 669 (1976); O'Neill v.
O'Neill, 293 S.C. 112, 117, 359 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1987); Millis v. Millis, 282 S.C. 610, 612, 320 S.E.2d
66, 67 (1984).
38. Statutes in a number of states provide that, absent a divorce decree or written agreement to
the contrary, alimony terminates upon the death of either party. See eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801
(West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64
(West 1990); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 316(b), 9A U.L.A. 147, 490 (1987)
("Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future
maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party .... "). Absent statutory authority, other
states have concluded that courts have no power to order alimony beyond death of the parties. See,
e.g., Kuhns v. Kuhns (In re Estate of Kuhns), 550 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1976); Dolvin v. Dolvin, 248
Ga. 439, 284 S.E.2d 254 (1981); see also Annotation, Death of Husband as Affecting Alimony, 39
A.L.R.2d 1406, 1418-20 (1955) (Supp. 1989) (supplementary survey of state cases holding that ar-
rears of installments accruing during the life of the payor may be collected after death), updating 18
A.L.R. 1040, 1054-55 (1922).
39. Termination upon the remarriage of the recipient occurs automatically under some states'
statutes. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4801(b), 4801.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, para 510 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (West 1990); see
also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 316(b), 9A U.L.A. 147,490 (1987) ("Unless otherwise
agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is
terminated upon... the remarriage of party receiving maintenance."). Absent such a statute, the
payor must obtain a modification from the court. See, eg., Bean v. Bean, 86 R.I. 334, 340, 134 A.2d
146, 149 (1957); see also H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 663-64 (discussing effect of remarriage on
alimony payments). Although an unmarried cohabitant does not incur a duty of support, a number
of states also require or permit termination of alimony when the recipient cohabits. See, eg., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1986) (additionally requiring that the wife be
"holding herself out as [the other man's] wife"); see also H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 665-68 (dis-
cussing effect on alimony payments of cohabitation by recipient); Annotation, Divorced Woman's
Subsequent Sexual Relations or Misconduct as Warranting, Along or with Other Circumstances, Mod-
ification of Alimony Decree, 98 A.L.R.3d 453, 461-67 (1980 & Supp. 1986) (survey of statutory
provisions and case law regarding effect of cohabitation on support obligation). See generally Note,
Alimony, Cohabitation, and the Wages of Sin: A Statutory Analysis, 33 ALA. L. REV. 577, 581-88
(1982) (comparison of anti-cohabitation statutes); Note, Domestic Relations: Oklahoma's Live-In
Lover Statute: § 1289(D) of Title 12, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 906 (1983) (analysis of Oklahoma's "live-in
lover" statute and anticohabitation case law).
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alimony.4° Either party may petition for a modification of alimony; the movant
must demonstrate that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred, 4 1
justifying a reduction or increase in the amount of support previously ordered. 42
Generally, only future payments can be modified, 43 and arrearages frequently
are regarded as final judgments,44 although equitable defenses may bar collec-
tion of past due alimony.45 Similarly, if no alimony was authorized at the time
of divorce by a court with proper jurisdiction,46 none can be ordered in the
40. A modification action is a continuation of the original divorce decree. H. CLARK, supra
note 21, at 659. In most states, express statutory authority extends the court's jurisdiction to modify
periodic alimony. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4801, 4801.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (West 1990); see also
Elliott v. Elliott, 14 Conn. App. 541, 543-44, 541 A.2d 905, 907 (1988) (Section 46b-86 of the Con-
necticut General Statutes allows modification of future alimony, but not arrearages, upon change of
circumstances, unless decree provides otherwise.); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 316(a),
9A U.L.A. 147, 489-90 (1987) ("provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be
modified only as to installments... upon a showing of changed circumstances"). States generally
permit modification or termination of alimony without specific statutory authorization when the
divorce court expressly retains jurisdiction. See, eg., Vomacka v. Vomacka (In re Marriage of
Vomacka), 36 Cal. 3d 459, 470, 683 P.2d 248, 255, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1984); Baker v. Baker, 53 Il1.
App. 3d 186, 190, 368 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1977). See generally Note, Domestic Relations: Modifica-
tion of Future Alimony Payments Due to Changed Circumstances, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 66 (1980).
Lump sum alimony, in contrast, is not modifiable. See Hartsfield v. Hartsfield, 384 So. 2d 1097,
1098-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), cert. denied, 384 So. 2d 1110 (Ala. 1980); Olson v. Olson, 114 Ill.
App. 3d 28, 31, 448 N.E.2d 229, 233 (1983); Doerfilnger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
41. To avoid duplicative litigation, parties to a modification proceeding may only present evi-
dence of events that occurred since the previous petition for modification. H. CLARK, supra note 21,
at 659.
42. Courts are reluctant to modify an alimony award upward when the payor's ability to pay
improves. See id. at 662-63 (alimony not intended to provide wife with "lifetime profit sharing
plan"). Modification is sometimes effective from date of filing of the petition, rather than the date of
the order. See Green v. Green, 21 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400-01, 315 N.E.2d 324, 328 (1974); McHann v.
McHann, 383 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1980); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 316(b), 9A
U.L.A. 147, 490 comment (1987).
43. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4801, 4801.5(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316(b), 9A
U.L.A. 147, 490 (1987); Elliott v. Elliott, 14 Conn. App. 541, 545, 541 A.2d 905, 907 (1987) (to
allow retroactive modification would encourage delay, as well as create hardship for a spouse who
had relied on the payments; applies to alimony pendente lite as well as permanent alimony). But see
Adair v. Martin, 595 S.W.2d 513, 515 (rex. 1980) (unpaid child support not a debt until reduced to
judgment). A few states expressly authorize retroactive modification. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.64 (West 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236, 244 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990); see also
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 344 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court did not abuse discretion
by refusing to forgive arrearages). Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100485, 102 Stat. 2343
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988)), requires states, as a condition for federal funding, to prohibit
retroactive modification of child support.
44. See, eg., Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 405, 378 A.2d 522, 526 (1977); Bean v.
Bean, 86 RI. 334, 340, 134 A.2d 146, 149 (1957).
45. See, eg., Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 602-03 (Utah 1979) (estoppel may bar collection of
alimony arrearages); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same); Anno-
tation, Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, So As to Bar Recovery ofArrearages of Permanent Alimony
or Child Support, 5 A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981) (citing cases).
46. A court with personal jurisdiction over either of the parties may grant a divorce. See Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296
(1942). A court must have jurisdiction over the defendant, however, to adjudicate financial matters,
including alimony. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,
547 (1948). See generally Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era,
58 TEX. L. REv. 501, 504 (1980) (discussing jurisdictional problems involved when couples move to
another state after marriage).
[Vol. 69
1991] BANKRUPTCY AND MARITAL DEBT
future because alimony presupposes an existing duty of support. Hence, no
modification can occur when nothing exists to be modified.47
The significance of traditional alimony has declined in recent decades, hav-
ing been replaced to a large extent by new forms of support awards.48 As a
result, the distinction between alimony and property division has become in-
creasingly difficult to draw.
B. Blurring the Lines Between Support and Property Division
The divorce reforms that began in the 1970s,49 which included the demise
of fault-based divorce,50 rapidly signaled the decline of traditional alimony.5 1
Even the term "alimony" itself has been replaced in many jurisdictions by the
label "maintenance" or "spousal support" to remove the connotation of fault.52
Although the concept of fault continues to play a role in some states,53 many
states now focus exclusively on need and ability.54
Contemporary divorce law not only terminates a couple's marital status,
but encourages conclusion of their economic interrelationship as well.55 In-
47. See, eg., Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Benavidez v. Bena-
videz, 99 N.M. 535, 538, 660 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1983). Child support, however, generally is regarded
as always modifiable prospectively, even if none was ordered previously. See, e.ag, Cannon v. Morris,
407 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Bucholt v. Bucholt, 152 Vt. 238, 242, 566 A.2d 409,
411 (1989). Child support arrearages usually are not modifiable, although some states will modify
under specific circumstances, and equitable defenses to collection may be raised. See Hoffman v.
Foley, 541 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (laches or estoppel may preclude recovery of
accrued child support payments); Annotation, Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, So As to Bar Re-
covery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support, 5 A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981); see also The
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (amending the Social Security Act,
Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651-665 (1982)) (§ 666(a) discusses support obligations, including child sup-
port and alimony as well as the appropriation of funds for the enforcement of support obligations).
48. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
49. See generally J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 85-176 (1972) (noting the liberali-
zation of the grounds upon which divorce may be based); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND
THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.D.L. Rav. 572
(1973); Levy, Introduction to a Symposium on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L.
REV. 531 (1973); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1169 (1974).
50. South Dakota was the final state to adopt a no-fault ground for divorce in 1985. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (1984). For a survey of current divorce grounds, see Freed &
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 515-16 (1990).
51. See Freed & Walker, supra note 50, at 544, 546-47. See generally McGraw, Sterin & Davis,
supra note 20, at 443 (examining the broad implications of the 1974 Ohio Divorce Reform Act);
Weitzman, supra note 20, at 1184 (study of the economic basis of the no-fault divorce); Weitzman &
Dixon, supra note 32, at 159 (discussing the effects of the abolition of fault as a basis for alimony
awards).
52. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.55 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 490 (1987).
53. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335 (Vernon Supp. 1990); see also Freed & Walker, supra
note 50, at 546-47 (su'vey of criteria for awarding alimony).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.55
(West 1990); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 347 (1987); see also
Freed & Walker, supra note 50, at 546-47 (survey of criteria for awarding alimony).
55. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act attempts to promote finality whenever practical by
encouraging property division and temporary support rather than permanent alimony. See UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147, 149 (1987).
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creasingly, since the widespread adoption of equitable distribution of property
schemes, 56 property division is employed as a substitute for alimony and pro-
vides a dependent spouse a means of self-support. 57 Although the theory of
property division is based on an allocation of assets acquired during marriage, 58
equitable division principles frequently take into account factors traditionally
considered in awarding alimony.59 Moreover, if division of marital assets in
kind is impractical, courts may direct a spouse who receives a greater amount of
property to repay the other in cash, often by means of a series of periodic pay-
ments. 6° Although such payments resemble alimony, they represent ownership
interests rather than support and are ordered as a definite, liquidated sum, and,
thus, are nonmodifiable. 6 1
Often, both spouses are liable to third party creditors for debts incurred
during the marriage. Customarily, responsibility for payment of specific debts
will be allocated to one of the divorcing parties. While the assumption of re-
sponsibility by one spouse does not relieve the other of liability to the third party
56. All common law property jurisdictions currently allocate property on divorce by equitable
distribution, rather than title. See Freed & Walker, supra note 50, at 523-24 (survey of property
division schemes). All of the community property states, except California, New Mexico, and Loui-
siana, also authorize equitable, rather than strictly equal, division of property on divorce. Id.
57. See H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 589. Property division generally precedes determination of
eligibility for alimony and need is evaluated in light of property distributed. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.55 (West 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(7) (1984 & Supp. 1990); UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 347-48 (1987).
58. Although some states require or presume an equal division of marital assets, the majority of
states apportion assets in an equitable procedure. See Freed & Walker, supra note 50, at 523-24
(breakdown of property division systems). Professor Clark has noted that the distinction between
community property states and common4aw marital property states has blurred to a significant
extent. H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 591. Even in community property states which require equal
division of community assets, the courts have noted that property division frequently reflects support
as well. See Roberts v. Roberts, 261 Cal. App. 2d 424, 427-28, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61-62 (1968).
59. Section 307 (Alternative A, intended for common-law property jurisdictions) of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act directs the court to apportion a divorcing couple's assets equitably
by considering
the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of
the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provi-
sions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the op-
portunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, de-
preciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 147, 238 (1987); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1513 (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-
121 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
60. See, e-g., Fink v. Fink, 25 Cal. 3d 877, 879, 603 P.2d 881, 883, 160 Cal. Rptr. 516, 518
(1979) (in-kind division not required; result of division must be equal); Hellwig v. Hellwig, 100 Ill.
App. 3d 452, 463-64, 426 N.E.2d 1087, 1092 (1981) (where property not susceptible to division in
kind or such division would be inequitable, court may award property to one spouse, subject to
repayment to nonacquiring spouse); Ashraf v. Ashraf, 134 Wis. 2d 336, 342-43, 397 N.W.2d 128,
131 (1986) (all major assets awarded to husband and husband required to pay wife value of half of
marital assets).
61. See, eg. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 397 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Drummond v.
Drummond, 209 Kan. 86, 91, 495 P.2d 994, 997-98 (1972); Mamalis v. Borovas, 112 N.H. 423,
429, 297 A.2d 660, 663 (1972).
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creditor,62 courts generally order the assuming spouse to hold harmless and in-
demnify the other spouse.63 The assumption results in the creation of a new
marital debt, owed by one spouse to the other. Typically, these assumptions of
debt are regarded as part of the property division under state law and, thus, are
not modifiable.64
If property division results in significant economic disparity, due to dispro-
portionate needs, education, or earning capacity, spousal support also may be
awarded to the disadvantaged spouse.65 Most states prefer short term, "rehabil-
itative" or "transitional" alimony over permanent periodic alimony whenever
feasible, in theory, to encourage the formerly dependent spouse to become self-
supporting.66 Some controversy exists regarding the modifiability of rehabilita-
tive alimony, although the developing trend is to permit modification in extreme
circumstances. 67
62. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 238, 784 P.2d 420, 425 (1989).
63. Some courts have held that an assumption implies an agreement to indemnify and hold
harmless. See, eg., Lewis v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 39 Bankr. 842, 846 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984);
Jensen v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 17 Bankr. 537, 539-40 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982). But see Lineberry
v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 9 Bankr. 700, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding assumption to be
in the nature of a property settlement and thus dischargeable).
64. See Cadwell v. Cadwell, 126 Ariz. 460, 461-62, 616 P.2d 920, 921-22 (1980); Schweizer v.
Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 636, 484 A.2d 267, 272-73 (1984); Freed v. Freed, 454 N.W.2d 516, 521
(N.D. 1990); H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 606; Annotation, Spouse's Liability, After Divorce, for
Community Debt Contracted by Other Spouse During Marriage, 20 A.L.R.4th 211 (1983).
65. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act requires that property division precede the deter-
mination of eligibility for support. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147,
348 comment (1987); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.55 (West 1990) (issue of whether one party
in a divorce is entitled to support may be reserved for determination at a later date even if property
division already has been determined).
66. See Tishkevich v. Tishkevich, 131 N.H. 404, 407, 553 A.2d 1324, 1326 (1989); Lovato v.
Lovato, 98 N.M. 11, 13, 644 P.2d 525, 527 (1982); W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW IN TRANSITION 320 (1983). Rehabilitative, rather than permanent, alimony is more likely to
be awarded when the marriage is of short duration, and the recipient spouse is in good health and
has a marketable skill, despite having been out of the job market for some time. See Akers v. Akers,
518 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 797 (S.D. 1984).
Preference for rehabilitative alimony does not limit courts from awarding traditional alimony when
the dependent spouse is unlikely to be able to become self-supporting, however. See Walter v. Wal-
ter, 464 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1985); Krauskopf, RehabilitativeAlimony: Uses andAbuses ofLimited
Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 579 (1988) (arguing that time limits are not justifiable as
mechanisms merely to allow spouse to adjust to lower standard of living). See generally Marshall,
Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 667, 673-79
(1985) (discussing development and significance of rehabilitative alimony); Comment, Rehabilitative
Alimony--A Matter of Discretion or Direction?, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 285, 289-303 (1984) (discuss-
ing factors for award and review of rehabilitative alimony).
67. See Larson v. Larson, 661 P.2d 626, 628 (Alaska 1983) (modifications permitted when orig-
inal prediction proved erroneous); Mann v. Mann, 523 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); In
re Marriage of Garelick, 168 Ill. App. 3d 321, 326, 522 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1988); Gunderson v.
Gunderson (In re Gunderson), 408 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Minn. 1987); Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707,
709-10 (Utah 1985); In re Marriage of Williams, 115 Wash. 2d 202, 206, 796 P.2d 421, 425 (1990)
(contractual alimony for specific term or until spouse completes education terminates upon remar-
riage unless express provision to contrary); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 451 (W. Va. 1987);
Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 78 (W. Va. 1984); see also Krauskopf, supra note 66, at 579;
Annotation, Power to Modify Spousal Support Award for a Limited Term, Issued in Conjunction with
Divorce, so as to Extend the Term or Make the Award Permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180, 201-35 (1988)
(generally discussing factors relevant to modification). But see Ressler v. Ressler, 17 Ohio St. 3d 17,
18, 476 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (1985) ("sustenance" alimony, conditionally terminable by death, cohabi-
tation, or remarriage, ordered for specific term of years not modifiable).
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Recently, many jurisdictions have fashioned innovative, hybrid awards,
sometimes designated "reimbursement" or "restitutional" alimony, to compen-
sate a spouse for contributions to the other's education or career enhancement. 68
These novel grants, usually awarded as a sum certain payable in installments,
have attributes of both support and property division, but do not fit neatly into
either category. 69 Unlike traditional periodic alimony, restitutional forms of ali-
mony generally are not modifiable, but are treated like installment payments of
lump-sum alimony, which, like property divisions, are regarded as final. 70
The various marital debts created by a divorce decree are integrally related.
All function, to some extent, to provide support for the recipient: to the extent
that the recipient receives other funds or assets from a former spouse, or is re-
lieved from responsibility for making payments on debts, she has greater re-
sources available to her for purposes of support. A prominent scholar has stated
that it is "fiction that there is some perceptible difference between awards of
alimony and property. There is no such difference. ' 71 Unfortunately, some
critical practical consequences continue to hinge on the distinction. Determin-
ing whether or not a marital debt is modifiable is, at the state court level, virtu-
ally the only occasion for inquiry into the nature of a marital debt as property or
support. 72 Furthermore, several developments have occurred that have made
even this limited inquiry more difficult to undertake at the state level.
First, a divorce decree or separation agreement frequently does not desig-
nate precisely whether a specific marital debt represents a division of property,
68. See, eg., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989); Bold v. Bold, 524 Pa.
487, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (1990); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 566, 489 A.2d 782, 784-
86 (1985); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 260-61 (S.D. 1984); In re Marriage of Lund-
berg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 10-12, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922-23 (1982); see also Batts, Remedy Refocus: In
Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 767-69
(1988) (discussing reimbursement alimony approach); Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L.
REv. 379, 416 (1980) (concluding that concepts of human capital and family dynamics cause spouse
to invest in education of other spouse and provide a legal basis for compensation).
69. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 499-501, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Lynn v. Lynn, 153
N.J. Super. 377, 382, 379 A.2d 1046, 1048 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 398
A.2d 141 (1979).
70. See Smith v. Smith, 224 N.J. Super. 559, 562, 540 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1988) (reimbursement
alimony intended as compensation rather than support); Zullo v. Zullo, 395 Pa. Super. 113, 118, 576
A.2d 1070, 1075 (1990) (reimbursement alimony not subject to termination on remarriage).
71. H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 658; see also Roberts v. Roberts, 261 Cal. App. 2d 424, 427, 68
Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (1968) (recognizing three types of property settlements).
72. Traditionally alimony and child support were enforceable by the contempt powers of the
court, see. eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.631 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-
19 (1978 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.305 (West 1981), and property division was not, see
Luna v. Luna, 125 Ariz. 120, 126, 608 P.2d 57, 63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). Today, in recognition of
the interrelationship of support and property division, many courts also authorize enforcement of
property division through contempt or by specific performance. See In re Marriage of Ramos, 126
Ill. App. 3d 391, 396, 466 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Smoot v.
Smoot, 329 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Minn. 1983); see also Feder, The Contempt Dilemma: Support vs.
Property and Third Party Debts (Part 2), FLA. B.J., Jan. 1985, at 67-69 (describing basis for using
contempt power); Krause, supra note 21, at 371-77 (discussing federal law reforms in child support
enforcement legislation); Note, Domestic Relations-Enforcement of Contractual Separation Agree-
ments by Specific Performance-Moore v. Moore, 16 WAKE FOREST L. RV. 117, 120 (1980) (ob-
serving that North Carolina courts will enforce support obligations through contempt proceedings).
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spousal support, or some combination of the two.73 The blending of terminol-
ogy mirrors the interrelationship between support and property division; conse-
quently, form, rather than substance, plays a significant role in categorizing a
maritai debt to determine its modifiability. Thus, if an award is structured to
resemble a property division and is designated as a fixed amount, not subject to
contingencies, it typically resists modification even if it was intended to function
as support.74
Second, state courts increasingly allow couples to contract with respect to
the modifiability or finality of specific terms, or to designate the circumstances
controlling future modification.75 Some courts have held that contractually de-
termined spousal support or alimony that has been approved by a court and
incorporated into a decree may be nonmodifiable, at least when the court has not
expressly reserved continuing jurisdiction,76 even if the court would not have
had authority to order the payments absent the parties' contract.77 Therefore,
under state family law principles, debts that clearly were intended to provide for
spousal support may not be modifiable by a state court despite a drastic change
in the parties' circumstances. Permitting divorcing couples to determine con-
tractually their post-marital financial relationship reflects a state family law pol-
icy of encouraging amicable dissolution and fostering certainty.7 8
73. See Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State,
59 N.C.L. REV. 819, 826-27 (1981) [hereinafter Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party].
74. See Annotation, Divorce: Power of Courts to Modify Decree for Alimony or Support of
Spouse Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520, 589-90 (1975).
75. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS § 4.08, at 225-26
(1984); A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRAcTs §§ 28.01-.05 (1989); Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form Over
Substance in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C.L. REv. 319, 319-20
(1991) [hereinafter Sharp, Semantics] (noting that "private ordering" of divorce consequences has
been approved almost unanimously by commentators, courts, practitioners, and the parties); Sharp,
Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1399, 1401 (1984) [hereinafter Sharp, Fairness Standards]; Sharp, Divorce and the Third
Party, supra note 73, at 848; Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 207, 228-34 (1982) (suggesting that marital contracts contribute to new
model of marriage).
76. See Kaiser v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 180, 186 N.W.2d 678, 683 (1971); Ressler v. Ressler,
17 Ohio St. 3d 17, 18, 476 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (1985) (unless jurisdiction is reversed, a debt fixed for a
number of years, even if it terminates on death or remarriage, cannot be modified). But see Bramson
v. Bramson (In re Marriage of Bramson), 83 Ill. App. 3d 657, 661, 404 N.E.2d 469, 471 (1980)
(statutory terminating events are mandatory, despite spouses' contractual agreement to the con-
trary); Gunderson v. Gunderson (In re Gunderson), 408 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Minn. 1987); Spingola v.
Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 741, 580 P.2d 958, 962 (1978) (alimony provisions may be modified despite
contrary contractual terms); In re Williams, 115 Wash. 2d 202, 206, 796 P.2d 421, 425 (1990) (de-
cree, based on agreement, must contain specific language to contrary to overcome automatic statu-
tory termination on remarriage). A contract between spouses does not bind a court in child support
matters, however. See Kaiser, 290 Minn. at 178, 186 N.W.2d at 683; Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C.
465, 470, 263 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1980); Williams v. Patton, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1541, 1541 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990) (settlement and release agreement forgiving child support arrearages held void);
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 147, 217 (1987).
77. See Aldredge v. Aldredge, 477 So. 2d 73, 74 (La. 1985) (agreement for modification of child
support without evidence of changed circumstances enforceable); Beard v. Worrell, 158 W. Va. 248,
264, 212 S.E.2d 598, 607 (1974) (contractual alimony upheld, although court could not have ordered
alimony in light of wife's fault); see also H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 766-68.
78. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147, 149 (1987) (act
attempts to "reduce the adversary trappings of marital litigation" and encourage parties "to make
amicable settlements of their financial affairs"); see also id. § 308 (describing property division as
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Thus, the relevance of characterizing a debt as either support or property
division has declined considerably at the state law level. The distinction remains
critical at the federal level,79 however, as dischargeability in bankruptcy depends
upon the federal court's characterization of a marital debt as either property
division or support. Because classification of a marital debt for federal bank-
ruptcy purposes remains unpredictable, the possibility of later bankruptcy signif-
icantly reduces the potential for certainty at divorce. State law policy of
encouraging certainty and finality through contractual freedom thereby is un-
dermined by bankruptcy law. Much of the difficulty lies with bankruptcy law's
approach to the modification of support awards.
III. BANKRUPTCY LAW AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
A. The Definition of Support for Bankruptcy Purposes
Bankruptcy law is grounded on the policy of affording debtors fresh eco-
nomic starts by permitting discharge of existing debts. 80 Countervailing policies
demand that debtors remain responsible for certain types of financial obligations
beyond discharge in bankruptcy.81 Primary among those nondischargeable
debts are obligations owed by the debtor to a former spouse or children that are
"in the nature" of support. 82 The policy of the exception reflects Congress's
primary method of providing future spousal support); Sharp, Semantics, supra note 75, at 319-20
(private agreements reduce psychological and economic costs of divorce, foster post-divorce cooper-
ation, decrease the impact of the divorce on children of the marriage, and promote judicial
economy).
79. Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 793 (1984), § 71 of
the Internal Revenue Code distinguished between alimony and property division payments for de-
ductibility purposes. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, further
revised the provisions relating to post-marital payments. Now either type of payment may be de-
ductible to the payor and taxable as income to the recipient if structured according to the appropri-
ate formula. See 26 U.S.C. § 71 (1988). See generally H. WREN, L. GABINET, & D. CARRAD, TAX
ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION (1987); O'Connell, The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act:
How We Got It and What We Can Do About It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473, 474-97 (1985) (describing legisla-
tive history); see also East v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1100, 1101
(U.S. Tax Ct. Memo 1989-658) (nature of payments for federal income tax purposes must be charac-
terized under federal law rather than state law).
80. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); see also Fibich
& Floyd, supra note 8, at 640-43 (consequences of filing bankruptcy petition); Jackson, The Fresh-
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985) (psychological and economic analy-
sis of bankruptcy discharge policy).
81. Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code enumerates the types of debts that are not dis-
chargeable by an individual debtor, including certain debts related to taxes or custom duties, debts
incurred by fraud or misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fine or forfeitures, educational
loans, and debts that were not discharged in a previous bankruptcy action. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(1988). The provisions apply whether the bankruptcy action is pursued under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988), a Chapter 13 wage earner plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1988), or a
Chapter 11 reorganization, 11 U.S.C. 1141(d)(2) (1988). See generally Ravin & Rosen, supra note 8,
at 3-5 (describing general procedure in dischargeability issues); White, Spousal and Child Support,
supra note 8, at 401 (discussing inclusion of past-due spousal and child support in Chapter 13 plans).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988) (quoted, in pertinent part, supra at note 9). Underlying the
exception are the notions that debtors, rather than the public, should support their dependents, Voss
v. Voss (In re Voss), 20 Bankr. 598, 601 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), and that Congress intended that
dependents not be left destitute by debtors' diicharge in bankruptcy, Hund v. Miller (In re Miller),
17 Bankr. 773, 775 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
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recognition of the importance of the support obligation both to the recipient and
to society.8 3
Although to be embraced within the exception a debt may not have been
assigned to another, except for certain governmental entities,8 4 the obligation
need not be payable directly to the dependent spouse. Even though a marital
debt is owed to a third party, if its payment benefits the dependent, the obliga-
tion still may be regarded as in the nature of support and thus avoid discharge.8 5
The Bankruptcy Code's express exception for support debts, however, does not
extend to debts incurred strictly as part of a division of property,8 6 despite the
reality that virtually all marital debts function, to some extent, as support to the
recipient.8 7
83. In Williams v. Holt (In re Holt), 40 Bankr. 1009, 1011 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984), the court
declared:
Bankruptcy legislation is rehabilitative in nature and must be construed strictly in favor of
its salutary purpose, debtor relief. Nevertheless, such law cannot be applied so as to render
an equally well-intended body of state law to be nugatory. That alimony and child support
obligations be recognized as unavoidable liabilities, is a principle just as valuable to society,
if not more so.
See also Balthazor v. Winnebago County (In re Balthazor), 36 Bankr. 656, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1984) (payments arising from paternity suit, although not literally excepted from discharge, are
nondischargeable in light of history and policy of exception). For a historical overview of the sup-
port exception, see Scheible, supra note 7, at 19-28; Schiffer, supra note 1, at 4-26; Swann, supra note
8, at 237-43; Comment, Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, at 521-26.
84. Section 523(a)(5)(A) of title 11 originally excepted specified support-related debts from dis-
charge, "but not to the extent that-(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by opera-
tion of law, or otherwise." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A) (1988). A 1981 amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
qualified the subsection to add "other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the
Social Security Act." A further amendment in 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, added "or any such debt
which has been assigned to the Federal government or to a State or any political subdivision of such
State." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A) (1988).
85. The majority of courts have held that payments made to third parties for the benefit of a
former spouse or children, such as medical, educational, and insurance payments, or payment of
certain living costs, such as rent, mortgage, and utility bills, may qualify for exemption from dis-
charge. See, e.g., Williams v. Holt (In re Holt), 40 Bankr. 1009, 1012 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Newkirk v.
Thomas (In re Thomas), 21 Bankr. 571, 572-74 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Tope v. Tope (In re Tope), 7
Bankr. 422, 425-26 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). Most courts find attorney fees awarded to a spouse in
divorce-related actions are nondischargeable. See, e.g., Silansky v. Brodsky (In re Silansky), 897
F.2d 743, 744 (4th Cir. 1990); Porter v. Gwinn (In re Gwinn), 20 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982); Marks v. Catlow (In re Catlow), 663 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1981); Pauley v. Spong (In re
Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1981). Most frequently, the issue arises in the context of one spouse's
assumption of a debt owed to a third party incurred during the marriage, in conjunction with a
provision indemnifying or holding harmless the nonassuming spouse. Two debts actually exist for
bankruptcy purposes: the debtor's liability to the third party, which generally will be dischargeable,
and the subsidiary obligation to the former spouse, which will not be dischargeable if it is determined
to have been intended to be in the nature of support. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500, 504-05
(R.I. 1985). In this context, the ensuing interspousal obligation is analyzed in the same manner as
direct debts to a spouse. See, e.g., Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.
1983); Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1933); Stevens v. French
(In re French), 19 Bankr. 255, 256 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); see also Scheible, supra note 7, at 41-46
(obligation to pay dependents' future expenses, assumption of joint marital debt, and obligation to
pay divorce debt to third party analyzed similarly for dischargeability); Comment, Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, supra note 8, at 534-38 (analysis of bankruptcy treatment of marital debts owed to third
parties).
86. See Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); Maitlen v. Maitlen (In re
Maitlen), 658 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1981).
87. See Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1108; Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434, 443
(Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
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Like the state courts, the bankruptcy courts have acknowledged the interre-
lationship between support and property division.8 8 However, the label at-
tached to the debt will not govern its classification for dischargeability purposes,
for federal law, not state law, controls the classification of a marital debt for
bankruptcy purposes. 89 Since the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in
1978,90 the courts have struggled to develop a federal standard for defining sup-
port, seeking guidance from general state law principles of support.9 1
The bankruptcy courts now concur that they should apply some version of
an "intent" test to determine the nature of a marital debt.92 Although the pre-
cise formulation of the intent test is not yet uniform, essentially that analysis
requires the bankruptcy court to discern whether the debt was intended by the
divorce court or the parties themselves to constitute support. 93 Because original
intent frequently is ambiguous and disputed, 94 the bankruptcy courts tend to
88. See, eg., Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107-08; Williams, 703 F.2d at 1057-58; In re Coil, 680 F.2d
1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Benich v. Benich (In re Benich), 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir.
1987) (debt may be in nature of support even when alimony not allowed under state law). See
generally Staggs, supra note 8, at 176-80 (acknowledging that even though Texas courts do not
award alimony, the federal courts are not bound by this label in determining dischargeability).
89. The legislative history of the current Bankruptcy Code expressly states that bankruptcy
law, not state law, will determine the nature of a marital debt. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6320; see also Goin v. Rives
(In re Goin), 808 F.2d 1391, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987) (federal law, not state law, determines whether an
obligation arising out of a divorce settlement is support); Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6,
7-8 (2d Cir. 1981) (Though bankruptcy law determines what constitutes support, the federal courts
are not to exclude state law principles in formulating the bankruptcy law of alimony and child
support.).
90. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
91. Courts frequently have noted that there is no federal law of domestic relations. See De-
Sylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Therefore, bankruptcy law has had to turn to general
state family law principles for guidance. See Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107-08; Spong, 661 F.2d at 9;
Freeburger & Bowles, supra note 8, at 604-09; Ravin & Rosen, supra note 8, at 7-9, 12-15; Scheible,
supra note 7, at 46-50; Comment, Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, at 526-28. One court has
noted, "What has emerged is an amalgam of federal bankruptcy law and state domestic relations
principles." Buccino v. Buccino, - Pa. Super. _, 580 A.2d 13, 17 (1990).
92. See, eg., Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Boyle v.
Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109
(6th Cir. 1983); In re Coil, 680 F.2d at 1171; see also Scheible, supra note 7, at 41-46 (nature of the
debt, not identity of creditor, should control classification); Comment, Bankruptcy Reform Act,
supra note 8, at 529-31 (discussion of tests applied by bankruptcy courts to determine nature of
marital debts).
93. If the debt was ordered by the state divorce court in a litigated action, the intent of the
court controls; if the obligation arose in a negotiated settlement agreement, the intent of the parties
must be established. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109; see also Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d 928,
931 (4th Cir. 1986) (when a jury decides the issue of alimony and property division, bankruptcy
courts must determine jury's intent in making the award); MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re Mac-
Donald), 69 Bankr. 259, 268 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) ("The crucial inquiry is whether the assumption
of that debt was intended to provide support"); Walter v. Walter (In re Walter), 50 Bankr. 523, 524
(Bankr. D. Del. 1985) (same); Bedingfield v. Bedingfield (In re Bedingfield), 42 Bankr. 641, 646
(S.D. Ga. 1983) (court must "ascertain whether the state court or the parties intended to create an
obligation to provide support"); Brown, supra note 8, at 539-44 (analysis of intent test).
94. The bankruptcy court in Schroeder v. Schroeder (In re Schroeder), 25 Bankr. 190 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1982), noted that the dischargeability question arises "almost every time a bankruptcy and
divorce befall a debtor within close proximity. Unfortunately, attorneys drafting divorce property
settlements and judgments do not usually anticipate.., a subsequent bankruptcy by one of the
parties. As a result, questions such as [these] arise time and again in the bankruptcy courts." Id. at
191; see also Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("very
often the parties have no intent to differentiate between an alimony debt and a property settlement
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place significant weight on the form of the award and its placement in the decree
itself,95 although the courts disagree on the extent to which the language of the
decree itself will affect the determination of intent.9 6
In addition, to ascertain the underlying intent, the bankruptcy courts con-
sider factors that state courts typically apply in ordering an award of support. 97
Accordingly, the courts commonly examine the family circumstances at the time
of the decree to determine whether the obligation was reasonably necessary to
maintain the spouse's needs and was reasonable in light of the debtor's ability to
pay.98 The court is more likely to find that a debt is dischargeable if its assump-
tion by the debtor exceeds the amount necessary for the support of the depen-
dents. 99 Pursuant to such an inquiry, the bankruptcy courts generally conclude
that if the debt has the effect of providing support, the necessary intention is
present and the obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 1° ° In other
words, the bankruptcy courts' application of an "intent" test is equivalent to a
"function" test.
The development of an intent test based on the function of a debt has done
much to standardize the method for characterizing debts in bankruptcy. At the
same time, however, the evolution of the function/intent test has created a fresh
controversy involving the relevance of the parties' present economic circum-
stances at the time of bankruptcy. 10 1 At issue is whether a debt that functioned
debt and will view both as merely financial obligations arising from the separation or divorce");
Graham v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 32 Bankr. 978, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (parties gave no
thought to possibility of bankruptcy).
95. See, eg., Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982); Gebhardt v. Gebhardt (In re
Gebhardt), 53 Bankr. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985); Alloway, 37 Bankr. at 425.
96. Most courts hold that the language of the decree or agreement is not determinative. -See
Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1111; Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 94 Bankr. 355, 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988); Myers v. Myers (In re Myers), 61 Bankr. 891, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); Tsanos v. Bell (In
re Bell), 47 Bankr. 284, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); 3 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 523.15 (15th ed. 1989). But see Yeates, 807 F.2d at 878 (clear, unambiguous language generally
controls); Stout, 691 F.2d at 861 (no gross abuse of discretion to look solely at property settlement as
whole); Clark v. Clark (In re Clark), 113 Bankr. 797, 801 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (no further investigation
necessary when intent clear from face of agreement; wife's waiver of alimony precludes nondis-
chargeable classification of husband's agreement to make home mortgage payments); Gebhardt, 53
Bankr. at 115 (bankruptcy court may not look behind unambiguous decree).
97. State law principles in general, not the law of the state that granted the divorce, should
guide the federal courts in determining dischargeability. See Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754
F.2d 902, 904 (11th Cir. 1985); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir.
1983); see also Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981) (federal courts are not
precluded from referring to the "law of the States").
98. See, e.g., Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109; Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 703 F.2d 1055,
1057 (8th Cir. 1983); MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 Bankr. 259, 278 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986); Graham v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 32 Bankr. 978, 980-81 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
99. See Bell, 47 Bankr. at 287; Altavilla v. Altavilla (In re Altavilla), 40 Bankr. 938, 941
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
100. See, eg., Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 (once intent is established, two other queries remain:
does the assumption of debt have the effect of providing support necessary to insure that daily needs
of dependents are met, and is the amount of support reasonable); Williams, 703 F.2d at 1057; Mac-
Donald, 69 Bankr. at 278; Myers, 61 Bankr. at 894-95; Mandel v. Goodman (In re Goodman), 55
Bankr. 32, 35 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985).
101. The question clearly is irrelevant when a court applies a strict "intent" test, for the determi-
native inquiry is to discern the intention of the parties or the court at the time the debt was created.
See, eg., Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1986) (despite wife's clear demonstration of
need, court found no mutual intent to treat payments as support). But when a version of a "func-
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
as support at the time of its origination must be classified as support regardless
of its current function or whether the present function of an obligation ulti-
mately determines its nature for bankruptcy purposes.
If the recipient no longer needs the payment of the debt as support, or if the
obligor's ability to pay has declined significantly, disagreement continues as to
whether a debt that originated as support is nondischargeable per se or whether
a debt may be reevaluated in light of the parties' circumstances at the time of
bankruptcy. To recharacterize a debt that originated as support as a dischargea-
ble, non-support debt unavoidably has the effect of modifying a preexisting state
court support award.1 0 2 Hence, the core of the current controversy is whether
the bankruptcy court is the appropriate forum for a modification action.
B. The Present Circumstances Test
1. The Warner Approach
Prior to the enactment of the present Bankruptcy Code in 1978, bankruptcy
courts generally assumed that the only relevant time for evaluating a marital
debt was the time at which the debt arose. As the function/intent test for deter-
mining the nature of a marital debt began developing, however, the bankruptcy
court in the 1980 case of Warner v. Warner (In re Warner)103 introduced the
notion that the present nature of a debt is relevant in determining its character
for dischargeability purposes.
The Warner court held that the competing policies, protecting dependents
and safeguarding the debtor's fresh start, must be balanced when determining
the nature of a debt under either section 17a(7) of the earlier act or section
523(a)(5) of the new Code.1° 4 Without reference to any specific language in the
statute, its legislative history, or case law precedent, the Warner court decided to
foster bankruptcy law's policy of relieving a debtor of his obligations by requir-
ing a debtor's dependents to establish a present need for the disputed payments
to avoid discharge.10 5 The court reasoned that because "any debt, not just tradi-
tional alimony payments, can be found to be support and thus nondischargeable,
the potentially unfair burden on the debtor, if only the original circumstances
were considered, might effectively abrogate his fresh start in a situation where no
tion" or "needs" test is used, a court must decide whether to consider the current effect of the
payment on the former spouse's or children's ability to continue to meet their daily living expenses,
or whether simply to conclude that if an obligation arose as support, it remains support and neces-
sarily is nondischargeable. See also Ravin & Rosen, supra note 8, at 9-I1 (courts are in conflict as to
the effect on dischargeability of changed circumstances).
102. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1983); infra
notes 153-165 and accompanying text. For discussion of modification of payments of support pursu-
ant to Chapter 13 plans, see Tucker, supra note 8, at 1359-61; Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to
Modify Alimony Payments of Chapter 13 Debtors, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 587 (1981).
103. 5 Bankr. 434, 442-43 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
104. Warner consolidated two cases, Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), Bankr. No. B-78-00046,
and Long v. Long (In re Long), Bankr. No. 79-01597. Warner arose under the previous Bankruptcy
Act, former 11 U.S.C. § 35a(7) (1976), while the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988),
applied to Long. The court resolved the issues under both statutory versions in the same manner.
Warner, 5 Bankr. at 438, 442-43.
105. Warner, 5 Bankr. at 442-43.
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countervailing necessity of support exists." 10 6 Thus, because the concept of sup-
port is inextricably associated with need,' 0 7 a payment to a former spouse whose
need has ended could no longer satisfy bankruptcy law criteria for nondis-
chargeability under the Warner test.
Warner enjoyed a brief endorsement by the bankruptcy courts.108 Most
courts limited their application of the present circumstances test to determining
the nature of an ambiguous debt; 1 09 some merely sought evidence of a continued
need by the recipient in order to qualify the debt as support, 110 while other cases
balanced the recipient's current need against the debtor's present ability to
pay. 1 ' A few courts took a broader view of Warner and applied the present
circumstances test to debts that clearly had originated as support; 11 2 several ex-
tended the analysis even to arrearages of support.1 13
In several subsequent cases, courts applied the Warner test restrictively,
limiting application of a present circumstances test to identification of the depen-
dents' current need. 114 Courts have ignored the fact that a debtor's financial
situation has worsened, so long as the recipient's need for support continues. 15
One court noted that absent a significant improvement in the recipient's circum-
stances, a support debt would not be discharged because bankruptcy policy was
not intended to drive the debtor's former wife into bankruptcy along with the
debtor. 1 6 This narrow application of a present circumstances test was not in-
consistent with Warner, because that opinion had focused primarily on the re-
cipient former wife's continued need rather than on the debtor ex-husband's
current ability to pay those obligations.
The Warner court, however, had in fact framed the issue considerably more
broadly, asserting that a bankruptcy court "should consider evidence of the par-
ties' relative financial circumstances" 117 since the divorce, and concluding that
106. Id. at 443. The court further supported its decision to consider present circumstances with
the language of § 17a(7), which excepted from discharge debts that "are" for support, emphasizing
the use of the present tense verb, but noted an absence of any specific tense in the language of
§ 523(a)(5). The court apparently overlooked or considered irrelevant the use of the present tense
"is" in subsection (B). See infra text accompanying notes 207-08.
107. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
109. See Stranathan v. Stowell (In re Stranathan), 15 Bankr. 223, 226 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981).
110. See, e.g., Lesher v. Lesher (In re Lesher), 20 Bankr. 543, 544 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982);
Singer v. Singer (In re Singer), 18 Bankr. 782, 787 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 787 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Miller (In re Miller), 17 Bankr. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); Brace v.
Moran (In re Brace), 13 Bankr. 551, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
111. See Schroeder v. Schroeder (In re Schroeder), 25 Bankr. 190, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982);
Tillett v. Tillett (In re Tillett), 22 Bankr. 907, 910 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); Stranathan v. Stowell
(In re Stranathan), 15 Bankr. 223, 228 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981).
112. See, e.g., Tillett, 22 Bankr. at 910-11.
113. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller (In re Miller), 17 Bankr. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re
Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270, 272 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
114. See, eg., Lesher, 20 Bankr. at 544; Singer, 18 Bankr. at 787; Miller, 17 Bankr. at 720; Brace,
13 Bankr. at 554.
115. See Singer, 18 Bankr. at 786-87; Hund v. Miller (In re Miller), 17 Bankr. 773, 775 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1982).
116. Brace, 13 Bankr. at 554.
117. Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434, 442 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (emphasis
added).
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relevant evidence of "any change in circumstances" of either spouse could be
introduced."1 8 Accordingly, some courts interpreted Warner to authorize exam-
ination of a debtor's changed circumstances as well as the recipient's, with re-
sults that favored the debtor over his dependents.1 19
When the debtor's present circumstances are taken into account the scales
tip heavily in his favor because his bankruptcy action itself is persuasive evi-
dence that his financial situation has deteriorated. For example, in Stranathan v.
Stowell (In re Stranathan),120 the bankruptcy court focused primarily on the
debtor's inability to pay the debts at the time of divorce 12 1 and held that the
former wife's clear need for continued support must be balanced against the
debtor's inability to pay. 122 Despite the probability that the wife would be
forced into bankruptcy if the debtor's assumption of marital debts were dis-
charged, the court reasoned that her "desire to avoid bankruptcy can only be
satisfied by sacrificing [the debtor's] right.., to a fresh start and by burdening
him with debts which are far beyond the capacity of either ... to pay.' 1 2 3
The Stranathan court limited its inquiry into present circumstances to situ-
ations in which the underlying nature of the debt was uncertain and rejected that
inquiry when no question existed as to the original intent in the creation of the
debt.124 Other courts, however, had employed the test to analyze marital obli-
gations that clearly had originated as support. One court went so far as to re-
duce a debtor's obligation to his former wife despite a state court's previous
description of the debt as "support alimony," not "alimony in lieu of property
division." 125 The court implicitly concluded that the debt no longer retained the
characteristics of support because of the debtor's subsequent financial impair-
ment, despite a lack of significant change in the wife's continued need. 126 Such
an overt modification of a state court award, in essence, expressly reforms the
original decree, clearly ranks the debtor's equities as superior to those of his
118. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
119. See Schroeder v. Schroeder (In re Schroeder), 25 Bankr. 190, 192 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1982);
Tillett v. Tillett (In re Tillett), 22 Bankr. 907, 910-911 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); Stranathan v.
Stowell (In re Stranathan), 15 Bankr. 223, 228 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981).
120. 15 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981). Stranathan consolidated five cases to determine
dischargeability under § 523(a)(5).
121. The court observed that the debts incurred by the debtor "greatly exceeded any reasonable
prospects of [his] abilities to pay." Id. at 228.
122. The court noted that although § 523(a)(5) does not contain a "needs test," need is signifi-
cant in determining the parties' original intent. Id. at 227.
123. Id. at 228.
124. The Stranathan court refused to consider present circumstances with respect to installment
payments on lump sum alimony that had been awarded to compensate a wife for her contribution to
the husband's professional degree and license. Id. at 227.
125. Tillett v. Tillett (In re Tillett), 22 Bankr. 907, 909 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982).
126. The court viewed the weekly payment, which the debtor had been ordered unconditionally
to pay his ex-wife for 520 weeks, as more in the nature of child support than alimony because the
payment had been ordered to permit the wife to retain the present home for the couple's children, at
least until they reached the age of majority. Id. Despite its interpretation of the debt as support, the
court reduced the payment to half of the previously ordered amount and specified that the obligation
should terminate upon the earlier ofthe children's attaining the age of majority or the wife's death or
remarriage. Id. at 910-11. It is not evident from the opinion that the husband's circumstances
actually had changed, but, rather, perhaps he had been too generous in his original agreement. See
id. at 910.
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dependents and usurps the authority of the state court. 127
Moreover, not only did some courts apply Warner to unambiguous support
obligations, but some subsequent cases applied the doctrine to past-due support
arrearages as well. The same judge who decided Warner extended the present
circumstances test to an action involving child support arrearages for which a
judgment had been obtained after the debtor had filed his bankruptcy peti-
tion. 128 Another court applied the Warner approach to a case dealing directly
with child support arrearages where the child in question had already reached
the age of majority, concluding that "the present circumstance of the person to
whom and the person on whose behalf the support was ordered paid" must be
considered, and the arrearages would be nondischargeable only if a present need
for that amount was found.129 Such decisions clearly authorized retroactive
modification of direct support obligations.' 30
More significantly, applying a present circumstances test to arrearages of
debts that clearly originated as support can lead to the illogical and unjust result
of permitting discharge of past-due support whenever external events, such as
emancipation of a child or remarriage of a former spouse, occur. 131 Permitting
retroactive modification of support by the bankruptcy court allows, and indeed
encourages, a debtor to benefit by delaying his bankruptcy action until such
events occur. The bankruptcy court could discharge the debtor of past support
obligations regardless of the degree of necessity that existed at the time the pay-
ments were due and without regard to how his dependents managed to pay their
living expenses when they arose. 132
As unsatisfactory as Warner may have been in the area of present obliga-
tions, it was this expansion of its analysis to support arrearages that contributed
to the Warner doctrine's demise. Some courts began to reject the Warner test
completely, declaring that only the original nature of an obligation is relevant to
127. Cf. Gebhardt v. Gebhardt (In re Gebhardt), 53 Bankr. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)
(intent must be discerned through construction and interpretation, not reformation of the
instrument).
128. In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980). Lovett was decided on the issue
of the application of the automatic stay, however, and the case was continued for a later dis-
chargeability hearing. Id. at 272.
129. Miller v. Miller (In re Miller), 17 Bankr. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (child support
arrearages nondischargeable because evidence showed payments still necessary). Curiously, the
court in Miller, in adopting the Warner analysis, stated that its decision was "compelled by the cases
cited in [that case]," id. at 720, although Warner itself cited no case authority for its application of a
present circumstances test.
130. Another bankruptcy court rejected the prospect of retroactive modification by applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to disallow discharge when arrearagcs of child support had been re-
duced to judgment by a state court. Perry v. Norfolk (In re Norfolk), 29 Bankr. 377, 378 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1983). The Norfolk court did not address whether the fesult would have been different if
the arrearages had accrued under a contractual obligation rather than a court decree or if no judg-
ment had been entered. See id. at 379. It did, however, apply the changed circumstances doctrine to
the debtor's default on an agreement to pay a third party for the benefit of the former wife, conclud-
ing that the wife's remarriage had terminated any support obligation by her ex-husband. Id.
131. See Sheffield v. Sheffield (In re Sheffield), 27 Bankr. 504, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
132. See id.
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its dischargeability.13 3 One court commented: "It is a basic premise that [the
bankruptcy court] does not have de novo jurisdiction; the Court is not to con-
sider the rights or equities of the parties with a view toward modifying or creat-
ing the rights which were established by the dissolution decree itself."' 134 Any
recognition of a change in circumstances with respect to a support obligation, it
held, should be made by the appropriate state court. 135
Warner's present circumstances test was renounced firmly when the issue
reached the appellate courts. In Benz v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 136 the District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee concluded that the bankruptcy court
improperly had attempted to balance competing policies when it applied a pres-
ent circumstances test:137
By creating an exception to the general rule of discharge, Congress,
implicitly, resolved the balancing of the very interests considered by
the court below in favor of the spouse. Congress did not, in any man-
ner, manifest an intention that the bankruptcy courts should embark
upon their own balancing of these policies. Under section 523(a)(5),
the bankruptcy courts are free to determine whether a debt character-
ized by a state court as alimony, support, or maintenance is in fact just
that. Upon finding that a debt is in fact support, alimony or mainte-
nance, however, the bankruptcy court is not free to discharge the debt,
Section 523(a)(5) states clearly that such debts are not to be
discharged. 138
The Nelson court further supported its conclusion by comparing the support
exception to section 523(a)(8), which prohibits discharge of certain educational
loans unless exception from discharge "will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents." 13 9 Had Congress intended a similar bal-
ancing process to be applied with regard to support related debts, the court rea-
soned, it would have framed the language of section 523(a)(5) accordingly. 140
Thus, the Nelson court concluded that the language of the Code and its legisla-
tive history prohibit consideration of the parties' present circumstances.
133. See Jensen v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 17 Bankr. 537, 540 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); Fritz v.
Daiker (In re Daiker), 5 Bankr. 348, 351-52 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
134. Fritz, 5 Bankr. at 351.
135. Id. at 352; see also Gentile v. Gentile (In re Gentile), 16 Bankr. 381, 383 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982) (evidence of present financial situation disregarded in deciding dischargeability of support
payments).
136. 20 Bankr. 1008 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
137. The bankruptcy court had determined that a judgment against the debtor for $16,550 plus
interest was "clearly in the nature of support, maintenance, or alimony," Benz v. Nelson (In re
Nelson), 16 Bankr. 658, 661 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 20 Bankr. 1008
(M.D. Tenn. 1982), as it was based on arrearages from an unsegregated order to pay the former wife
$500 per month as alimony and child support. See id. at 659, 651. The bankruptcy court, however,
adopted the Warner reasoning and discharged the debt because the youngest child had reached
majority and the former wife had remarried. Id. at 662. Because none of the parties for whom the
support had been ordered would be left impoverished, and appropriate state remedies had existed
during the period of actual need, the bankruptcy court had concluded that the fresh start policy
should prevail. Id.
138. Nelson, 20 Bankr. at 1011-12 (footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 1011 n.3 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(B) (1988)).
140. Id. at 1011.
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Although the Nelson court could have restricted its rejection of Warner to
cases involving arrearages or unambiguous debts that clearly had originated as
support, it chose instead to discredit the present circumstances doctrine entirely.
Other courts promptly adopted Nelson's analysis. 14 1 Nelson thereby apparently
signalled the demise of the Warner doctrine and retired the notion that present
circumstances are relevant in any context. That retirement, however, proved to
be temporary.
2. The Calhoun Test
The case of Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun),142 decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1983, revived the controversy
that Nelson appeared effectively to have laid to rest. Unlike Warner, which at-
tempted to balance overall equities and competing policies, 143 Calhoun set out a
three-part test for determining the nature of ambiguous marital debts. In so
doing, however, it laid new groundwork for an expanded controversy over the
relevance of present circumstances in a bankruptcy court proceeding.
The Calhoun court was faced with the recurring problem of determining
the dischargeability of a debtor-husband's assumption of marital debts owed to
third parties and his related agreement to hold his former wife harmless on those
debts.144 Noting that all assumptions of marital debts affect the other spouse's
ability to support herself to some extent,' 45 the Calhoun court formulated a
three-step test to determine dischargeability. 146
Discerning the divorce court's or the parties' intent in creating the obliga-
tion is merely the initial step of the Calhoun test.147 If the bankruptcy court
does not find that the debt was intended to be support, the inquiry ends and the
debt is discharged. 148 If, however, the appropriate intent to create a support
debt is discerned, the court must proceed to the second step. ,
The second phase of the Calhoun test begins the inquiry into present cir-
141. See Comer v. Comer (In re Comer), 27 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
Warner's balancing test and adopting Nelson analysis), aff'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.
1984); Aurre v. Kalaigan (In re Aurre), 60 Bankr. 621, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("better
reasoned" cases reject present circumstances doctrine); Rombold v. Department of Human Re-
sources (In re Rombold), 34 Bankr. 396, 398 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (Nelson gives "well-stated basis"
for rejecting present circumstances test); Vickers v. Vickers (In re Vickers), 24 Bankr. 112, 116
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding Warner test convincing, but constrained to follow Nelson).
142. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 103-107.
144. The husband had assumed debts for construction of a swimming pool at the wife's home, a
loan to consolidate other marital debts, charge card accounts relating to the husband's training and
business, and the lien on the husband's vehicle. The court distinguished the debts owed directly to
the third party creditors from the obligation to hold the wife harmless on those debts. Calhoun, 715
F.2d at 1105, 1106 & n.4.
145. Id. at 1108.
146. Id. at 1109-10. Some courts have interpreted Calhoun to require additional steps. See
Helm v. Helm (In re Helm), 48 Bankr. 215, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (four-part test); Lewis v.
Lewis (In re Lewis), 39 Bankr. 842, 846 n.6 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (five-part test); see also Brown,
supra note 8, at 520-26 (four-part test); Freeburger & Bowles, supra note 8, at 609-13 (four-part test).
147. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109. Calhoun allowed the courts to consider any relevant evidence,
including the traditional factors used by state courts in awarding support, to determine intent. Id.
148. Id.
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cumstances. The bankruptcy court must determine the effect of the debt on the
recipient's actual needs, evaluating that spouse's current dependency on the pay-
ment. The court must focus on the practical result that discharge would effect
on the dependent spouse's ability to provide for her daily needs: "If without the
loan assumption, the spouse could not afford daily necessities, such as food,
housing and transportation, the effect of the loan assumption may be found 'in
the nature of' support for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act." 149 If "drastic
changes in the former spouse's capabilities for self-support" have occurred, the
debt that originated as one for support may have been altered sufficiently to
permit total or partial discharge. 150 Thus, without reference to Warner 151 or its
progeny, the Calhoun court held that the recipient's present circumstances are a
mandatory consideration once the intent to create a support debt is found.
Having survived the first two stages in a dischargeability determination, the
debt is subjected to the third inquiry: whether the amount is reasonable in light
of the debtor's general ability to pay. If the debt is "manifestly unreasonable," it
must be reduced or eliminated.152 The Calhoun court emphasized that the de-
termination of reasonableness should focus primarily on the debtor's circum-
stances at the time the obligation was created. Significantly, however, the court
further authorized consideration of the debtor's current financial circumstances
at the time of bankruptcy as well.153 Although a debt may have represented a
reasonable amount of support at its creation, if the debtor's financial condition
has declined to the extent that the continuing obligation has become "inequita-
ble," the bankruptcy court must reclassify and discharge any amount that is
excessive, setting a "reasonable limit" on the nondischarged continuing obliga-
tion.15 4 The Calhoun court justified its consideration of present circumstances
by noting that state courts consider the debtor's ability to pay when ordering
support. 155 Conceding that such a factual inquiry is difficult, the Calhoun court
believed that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to allowing a debtor to
contract away his bankruptcy rights, which is impermissible.15 6
The court cautioned, however, that this final inquiry into the debtor's finan-
cial circumstances should be limited to determining whether such an agreement
was clearly unreasonable, constituting "an excessive degree of support beyond
that which any state court would reasonably allow given the parties' relative
circumstances."' 5 7 The court added:
It is not intended that the Bankruptcy Court sit as a "super-divorce"
court. Rather, the purpose of such inquiry is to ensure that the degree
of support represented by the loan assumptions, particularly in uncon-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. Utah 1980).
152. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
153. Id. at 1110 n.11.
154. Id. at I110.
155. See id.
156. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 80, at 1398-1404 (justifications for nonwaivable right of
discharge).
157. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110 n.12.
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tested cases, does not clearly exceed that which might reasonably have
been awarded as support by a state court after an adversarial
proceeding. 158
In making such an inquiry, the bankruptcy court conducts what is equivalent to
a state court hearing for modification of support. Thus, Calhoun reintroduced
the idea, albeit in the limited context of third party debt assumptions, that the
present circumstances of both parties are relevant in determining the nature of a
marital debt. Calhoun clearly authorizes bankruptcy courts to modify certain
types of state court support decrees.
The Calhoun court acknowledged that, in some cases, an inquiry into rea-
sonableness will have the effect of modifying a state court decree or judgment,
but found such a result unavoidable in creating a federal standard for determin-
ing the nature of the debt.15 9 However, in contrast to a state court modification
proceeding, which can adjust a support debt either upward or downward, 160 the
bankruptcy court modification action pursuant to the Calhoun test can only de-
crease or eliminate the support obligation. 161
The Calhoun court discounted the impact of its decision by noting that a
state court rarely would award unnecessary support in a contested case; thus
litigated support obligations seldom would be affected by the bankruptcy ac-
tion. 162 Additionally, the court declared that affording comity to state court
decrees is less important in the more common situation where the support award
is the result of parties' private agreement that has been incorporated into a de-
cree, rather than the result of a true adversary action.16
3
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1109 n.10; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 555 (any support not meeting Calhoun
criteria may be modified).
160. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussion of state court modification
principles).
161. But cf. Brown v. Brown (In re Brown), 37 Bankr. 295, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (when
debtor discharged of obligations to make credit card payments, for which he had been allowed set-off
against child support payments, obligation to make those support payments in full was "resurrected"
because only the right to set-off had been discharged).
162. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.10. The court's observation seems to imply that relatively few
support awards would be affected by its decision. In fact, most divorces today are negotiated rather
than litigated. See H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 755 (estimating that about 90% of divorces are
uncontested and that more than half are resolved by contract); Levy, Comment on the Pearson-
Thennes Study and on Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 525, 530 (1984) (an estimated 85-90% of divorce
actions are resolved by negotiation). Those agreements generally are conducted "in the shadow of
the law"; that is, they are settled on terms comparable to those that a court likely would have
reached had litigation been necessary. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 950 (1979). If
privately negotiated support settlements are exposed to greater risk of discharge, divorcing parties
will be encouraged to litigate and the state public policy of promoting private resolution of divorce,
see supra text accompanying note 78, will be thwarted, and an enormous caseload burden will be
placed on state divorce courts.
163. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.10. The court noted that to allow the parties' agreement to
control impermissibly would allow the debtor to contract away his bankruptcy rights. Id. The
Calhoun court's observation largely disregards the fact that when the parties have settled their finan-
cial matters by private agreement, the agreement frequently receives at least implicit judicial ap-
proval by being merged or incorporated into the divorce decree; thus, the contract becomes part of
the court order itself. See Sharp, Fairness Standards, supra note 75, at 1408-10; see also Sharp,
Semantics, supra note 75, at 326 (urging courts to impose mechanisms for meaningful judicial ap-
proval or review of marital settlement agreements). By regarding privately settled support payments
as less deserving of protection, certainty and stability are undermined. In the case of either a private
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Calhoun regards present circumstances as critical to determining whether
ambiguous debts are nondischargeable, with the potential for modification
merely an inevitable result of this definitional process. The Calhoun court re-
peatedly emphasized that it intended examination of the parties' present circum-
stances only in the context of evaluating the nature of subsidiary obligations in
the form of loan assumptions, and that such examination should be limited to
exceptional circumstances in which the support obligation has become grossly
and unreasonably inequitable. 164 Furthermore, the court cautioned that the
bankruptcy court should exercise restraint in examining the dependent spouse's
economic circumstances and discharge only amounts that clearly exceed those
which a state court reasonably might have awarded in an adversarial
proceeding.1 6
5
3. Extension of the Calhoun Test
Despite its qualifications and caveats, the Calhoun case resurrected the
specter of the Warner doctrine. Unlike Warner, however, Calhoun expressly
limited inquiry into present circumstances to cases involving continuing obliga-
tions based on hold-harmless provisions in connection with assumptions of joint
marital debts, 166 not debts owed directly to a spouse or to arrearages. Nonethe-
less, if a marital obligation on a third-party debt that originated as support can
be transformed into a dischargeable debt by changed circumstances, Calhoun's
rationale would appear to be equally applicable to support debts in other forms.
Accordingly, although most courts have applied the Calhoun test conserva-
tively, 167 a significant minority extended the Calhoun doctrine to a broader cate-
gory of debts. 168 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals itself noted, in a
subsequent case, that Calhoun's analysis clearly applies to other types of cases,
and, indeed, that it had "general applicability in cases brought under
§ 523(a)(5)." 169
The bankruptcy court case of Helm v. Helm (In re Helm)170 best illustrates
a broad interpretation of Calhoun. The court in Helm considered application of
agreement or a court-ordered award, it will be unlikely that the parties will have considered the
impact of a later bankruptcy on the debt in question.
164. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
165. Id. at 1110 n. 11; see also Helm v. Helm, (In re Helm), 48 Bankr. 215, 218 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985) (importance of state court having independently assessed need and nature of debt).
166. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.9.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
168. See, eg., Caughenbaugh v. Caughenbaugh (In re Caughenbaugh), 92 Bankr. 255, 258
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (periodic alimony payments reduced from $130 to $80 per week, despite
former wife's continued need); Erler v. Erler (In re Erler), 60 Bankr. 220, 223 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1986) (car loan assumption too excessive in light of debtor's present circumstances; reduced by more
than half); Helm, 48 Bankr. at 221-25 (applying Calhoun test to direct payment to spouse); Perkins
v. Perkins (In re Perkins), 36 Bankr. 618 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (remanding for determination of
nature of arrearages per Calhoun criteria).
169. Singer v. Singer (In re Singer), 787 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., concur-
ring); see also Brown, supra note 8, at 526-28 (discussing Singer).
170. 48 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); see also Brown, supra note 8, at 528-29 (discussing
Helm).
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the present circumstances test mandatory, not merely permissive, 17 1 stating that
"a bankruptcy court would be remiss in not considering the remarkably changed
circumstances worked by bankruptcy." 172 Consideration of the debtor's cur-
rent ability, according to the Helm court, "establishes the dominance of federal
bankruptcy policy over traditional state law concepts of support," and the rea-
sonableness of support payments must be measured against the fresh start policy
of bankruptcy law.1 73 The Helm court thus reformulated the Calhoun test174
and applied that revised version to analyze a debt owed directly to a former
spouse.1 75 However, the court urged bankruptcy courts to exercise restraint in
establishing a "reasonable limit" on the dischargeability of a debt, noting that
such an inquiry may stretch the boundaries of the controlling statute, section
523(a)(5). 17 6 The Helm court further interpreted Calhoun to apply only to pri-
vately negotiated agreements, not to fully litigated court orders for support, and
explicitly encouraged litigation in divorce cases in which a potential for bank-
ruptcy exists. 177
The Helm court also took a slightly different approach to the issue of need.
The Calhoun test for determining the nature of a debt examines the debt's pres-
ent nature by segregating the recipient's present need from the debtor's ability to
pay, and by evaluating that need in isolation before considering the debtor's
ability to pay.17 8 Thus, the Calhoun court either assumed that needs may be
calculated in a vacuum or that only a uniform, subsistence level of need is rele-
171. The Helm court interpreted Calhoun merely to permit, not to require, an evaluation of
present circumstances. Helm, 48 Bankr. at 225 n.30. But see Angel v. Angel (In re Angel), 105
Bankr. 825, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (review of debtor's current ability to pay is "permissive,
not mandatory").
172. Helm, 48 Bankr. at 225 n.30 (emphasis in original). In Helm, the former wife's net worth
was between $300,000 and $500,000, with an annual income of $55,000 and $28,000 during the two
years preceding the bankruptcy action. Id. at 217-18. At that time, the debtor owned only nominal
assets, plus debts of over $1.4 million, and had yearly net incomes of $3,000 and $9,227. Id. The
court reduced the question to whether the debtor's agreement to pay the wife $1,000 a month was
necessary to provide for her daily needs under the circumstances. Id. at 224. The Helm court
stated, "Judge Kennedy's writing is a carefully detailed construct, a literal handbook for bankruptcy
judges, and to perceive it only as a narrow assumption-of-debt case is to view the world through the
wrong end of a telescope. We take Calhoun as having general applicability to all support cases." Id.
at 220.
173. Id. at 225; see also Caughenbaugh v. Caughenbaugh (In re Caughenbaugh), 92 Bankr. 255,
257 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (reasonableness of continuing obligation determined by weighing
against debtor's right to fresh start).
174. The court in Helm restated the Calhoun test as being comprised of four elements, "intent,
effect, amount and apportionment." Helm, 48 Bankr. at 221 (emphasis omitted). The court added,
"We have also taken a necessary editorial liberty in our summary of the four-part analysis. Calhoun
used the phrase 'loan assumption' several times in the formula .... Having held that Calhoun
applies to all support cases, we have eliminated that phrase as unduly restrictive." Id. at 221 n.17.
175. Although the court concluded that the case could be determined on the basis of intent
alone, it addressed each step of the Calhoun test in an attempt to "facilitate the inevitable appeal"
and relitigation on remand. Id. at 221.
176. Id. at 225.
177. Id. at 225-26; cf. Catlett v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 48 Bankr. 616, 617 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1985) (award in contested case "not to be treated lightly"), aff'd on reconsideration, 58 Bankr. 72
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
178. See Johnson v. Seta (In re Seta), 45 Bankr. 8, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (although former
wife's earning power was considerably less than debtor's, in light of her remarriage her needs were
"currently being met more than adequately;" therefore, it was unnecessary to determine reasonable-
ness of debt).
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vant.179 Despite its expansion of the present circumstances test, however, the
Helm court recognized that need is a relative concept, correlated to both parties'
circumstances. Although noting that the marital standard of living generally
enters into the calculation of need, the court cautioned that the bankruptcy
court should not "force the perpetuation of an artificially grand life style."'180
4. Limitations and Clarifications of the Calhoun Test
Although some cases extended the Calhoun test, most bankruptcy courts
within the Sixth Circuit have applied the doctrine conservatively.181 One court
emphasized that, unlike the earlier discredited Warner test, the Calhoun test
does not authorize modification in order to balance the equities at the time of
bankruptcy;18 2 rather, the test is applied solely to determine whether an ambigu-
ous debt qualifies as support, thereby avoiding discharge.183
Other courts stressed that the present needs test has no application in cases
in which the obligations fall clearly within traditional concepts of support.18 4
179. This author has argued that need should be defined in terms relative to the marital standard
of living. See Scheible, supra note 7, at 60-61; see also Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/
Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 257 (1989) (arguing that
benefits and burdens should be allocated according to the "gains and losses of the marriage that are
capable of being shared when it ends"). To view need as an absolute leads to absurd results, as
illustrated by the case of Costell v. Costell (In re Costell), 75 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
In Costell, a bankruptcy court, applying the Calhoun test, held that the husband's obligation to pay
first and second mortgages on the family residence were in the nature of support because the former
wife and children still lived in the home. However, the court stated that the husband's additional
agreement to make repairs on that residence was dischargeable unless those repairs were "necessary
for the safety and well-being" of the family, taking a narrow view of the concept of "need." Id. at
356. Even more oddly, the court classified as dischargeable the husband's obligation to pay credit
card debts that had been incurred for his own and his girlfriend's benefit, holding that the wife must
show that each underlying expenditure was necessary for her and the children's support to avoid
discharge, rather than analyzing the effect on the dependents should the wife be required to pay that
debt. Id.
180. Helm v. Helm (In re Helm), 48 Bankr. 215, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
181. See, e.g., Angel v. Angel (In re Angel), 105 Bankr. 825, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (re-
view of debtor's current ability to pay permissive, not mandatory; insufficient evidence to support
finding that support has become inequitable); see also Brown v. Brown (In re Brown), 46 Bankr. 612,
614 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (rejecting present circumstances portion of Calhoun analysis, viewing
abstention from modification as mandated by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333).
182. Gerdes v. Gerdes, 33 Bankr. 860, 869-70 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
183. Id. at 870. Gerdes applied the Calhoun test in a Chapter 11 proceeding to determine the
nature of a former wife's lien on real property that the debtor sought to sell free from encumbrances,
The bankruptcy court noted that the process of weighing the wife's current support needs against the
debtor's present circumstances does not entail an application of "general equitable considerations,"
Id. The Gerdes court applied the present circumstances test to refuse discharge of a lien against the
debtor's real property, which it found to be in the nature of temporary support, but relieved the
debtor of his personal guarantee of the debt. Based on the parties' current financial status, however,
the court felt "constrained to conclude that the provisional alimony must be reduced accordingly
and the Plaintiff should no longer be required as alimony to guarantee the future funding of the
monthly lease payments over the amount of the income realized from the leases." Id.; see also
Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deatherage), 55 Bankr. 268, 271 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (Calhouln
test applies only to distinguish support from property division aspects of hybrid debt).
184. See Troxell v. Troxell (In re Troxell), 67 Bankr. 328, 331 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986)("[T]he Calhoun test is appropriate only for ongoing support obligations, not past child support
arrearages."); McArtor v. Rowles (In re Rowles), 66 Bankr. 628, 631 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)
(memorandum opinion); White v. White (In re White), 55 Bankr. 878, 884-85 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn,
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Although there are some cases to the contrary,18 5 most courts that have relied
on Calhoun have agreed that bankruptcy courts may not modify support awards
except in determining their dischargeability.18 6 Any modification by the bank-
ruptcy court is to be made only at the time discharge is considered and only
under appropriate circumstances; the bankruptcy court retains no continuing
jurisdiction to modify support at a later time. 187 Moreover, most courts have
rejected application of Calhoun's present circumstances test to support arrear-
ages. Application of a present circumstances test in that context theoretically
permits a debtor to "control the character of debts owed to a former spouse
simply by not paying amounts clearly due for support so that the spouse is
forced to be self-supporting." 188
Several appellate courts outside of the Sixth Circuit initially accepted por-
tions of Calhoun's changed circumstances test.18 9 Although declaring that the
bankruptcy court has no authority to balance competing policies, the federal
1985) (no modification of future alimony payments, although Calhoun applies to hold-harmless
agreement related to educational loans).
185. See Johnson v. Seta (In re Seta), 45 Bankr. 8, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (debtor's obligation
to pay second mortgage on marital residence was not in nature of support because home had been
sold; even though sale price of home was insufficient to pay off second mortgage, former wife's needs
were being more than adequately met and debt lacked necessary effect as support); Perkins v. Per-
kins (In re Perkins), 36 Bankr. 618, 621 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (remanding for determination of
nature of arrearages per Calhoun criteria); cf. Brandstadt v. Brandstadt (In re Brandstadt), 45
Bankr. 538, 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (emphasizing that present need is relevant only if the
threshold Calhoun factors, intent and effect, are fulfilled; therefore, debts which unambiguously were
not intended to provide support are not to be evaluated in light of present circumstances); Lelak v.
Lelak (In re Lelak), 38 Bankr. 164, 168-69 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (same); Plaugher v. Plaugher (In
re Plaugher), 37 Bankr. 760, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (same).
186. See, e.g., Hund v. Miller (In re Miller), 36 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); see
also Ramus v. Ramus, (In re Ramus), 32 Bankr. 67, 68 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (bankruptcy court
abstained from deciding debtor's action to modify alimony as part of Chapter 13 proceeding; identi-
cal action was pending in state court).
187. Rowles, 66 Bankr. at 631; see also Winders v. Winders (In re Winders), 60 Bankr. 746, 746
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (court "recharacterized" portion of lien against home as support, leaving
to state court any further questions as to appropriate level of support after bankruptcy); Lelak, 38
Bankr. at 169 (court advised the former spouse to apply to the state court for modification of support
if necessary because of the effect of discharge); Graham v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 32 Bankr. 978,
985 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (enforcement of nondischargeable debts is matter for state court). But
cf Brown v. Brown (In re Brown), 37 Bankr. 295, 299-300 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (discharge of
debtor's obligation on credit payments "resurrects" his obligation to make child support payments;
debtor was to receive set-off against those payments only while paying third party creditor).
188. Rowles, 66 Bankr. at 631. But see Migliarese v. Migliarese (In re Migliarese), 38 Bankr.
978, 979-80 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (bankruptcy court discharged debt clearly intended for support
for period after former wife's remarriage, despite state court judgment on arrearages).
189. See Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates), 44 Bankr. 575, 580 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit court acknowledged Calhoun's present
circumstances test, but concluded that it did not need to address that issue because the plaintiff-
wife's circumstances had not changed since the divorce. Yeates v. Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 n.3
(10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit later rejected the Calhoun test in Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865
F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). See infra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
Another District Court extensively cited Calhoun with approval, agreeing that the debtor's current
ability to pay is relevant in determining the nature of an obligation. Bedingfield v. Bedingfield (In re
Bedingfield), 42 Bankr. 641, 647 (S.D. Ga. 1983). The Bedingfield court cautioned, however, that a
debtor "should not be able to escape his familial obligations by receiving a discharge in bankruptcy,"
avoiding his "moral and legal obligations." Id. at 647. Bedingfield's authority in this regard has
been overruled by a subsequent Eleventh Circuit decision. See Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754
F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1985).
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district court in Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates) 190 agreed that an improvement in
the recipient spouse's financial condition at the time the bankruptcy is filed may
change the underlying nature of the payment, making it "superfluous, and dis-
chargeable." 19 1 The Yeates court emphasized that such a change must indicate
a "material and substantial" improvement that alters the nature of the payment
from necessary support to merely an increase in income.1 92 This inquiry does
not require consideration of general equitable factors because the current finan-
cial condition of the debtor is irrelevant, the bankruptcy action itself indicating a
"constantly worsening financial condition." 193 The limited version of the pres-
ent circumstances test in Yeates regards as relevant only a significant decrease in
the recipient's need, but still constitutes a modification of a state support decree.
Even among courts that have adopted the Calhoun analysis, little tendency
to expand the test beyond its initial context has surfaced. Most of the cases,
moveover, have added little to the analysis of the test.194 The preponderance of
evaluation is found in the opinions that reject the Calhoun test.
5. Rejection of the Calhoun Test
Calhoun's revival of the present circumstances test soon met with strong
disapproval. Five Circuit Courts of Appeal, in addition to the Sixth Circuit,
have directly addressed the issue and have flatly denied that present circum-
stances have any relevancy in dischargeability determinations. 195 Although the
190. 44 Bankr. 575 (D. Utah 1984).
191. Id. at 580. In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue of
changed circumstances, as none existed in this case. Yeates, 807 F.2d at 878 n.3.
192. Yeates, 44 Bankr. at 580. The court suggested that a significant event such as remarrying or
securing a much higher-paying job might evidence a material, substantial improvement, but not the
mere fact that the recipient was able to "'keep the wolf from the door' by obtaining financial help
from relatives, the government, or charitable institutions." Id. at 581. But see Boyd-Leopard v.
Douglass (In re Boyd-Leopard), 40 Bankr. 651, 656 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984) (fact that former wife sold
residence and was living with father indicated that debtor's obligation to pay second mortgage no
longer necessary and therefore dischargeable).
193. Yeates, 44 Bankr. at 580.
194. See, eg., Troup v. Troup (In re Troup), 730 F.2d 464,466 (6th Cir. 1984) (court affirmed in
light of Calhoun); Leupp v. Leupp (In re Leupp), 73 Bankr. 33, 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Pitzen
v. Pitzen (In re Pitzen), 73 Bankr. 10, 12-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (former spouse's need contin-
ued, debtor's position improved); Brock v. Barlow (In re Brock), 58 Bankr. 797, 806-07 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1986); Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (no
change in circumstances had occurred); Sanders v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 51 Bankr. 695, 697
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (only portion of debtor's assumption of home mortgage nondischargeable
because wife only deprived of four month's occupancy by debtor's failure to make payments);
Wright v. Wright (In re Wright), 51 Bankr. 630, 632 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); Elder v. Elder (In re
Elder), 48 Bankr. 414, 417 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (not excessive or unreasonable); Holland v.
Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (no material change of cir-
cumstances between divorce and bankruptcy); Lewis v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 39 Bankr. 842, 845
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (promise to indemnify must be related to past or present support needs to
survive discharge); Chambers v. Chambers (In re Chambers), 36 Bankr. 42, 45 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1984) (court need not decide whether to balance equities in this case because of insufficient evidence
regarding parties' current financial health; disparity in opportunity between spouses sufficient to
conclude debt was in nature of support); Brown v. Brown (In re Brown), 37 Bankr. 295, 299 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1983); Wesley v. Wesley (In re Wesley), 36 Bankr. 526, 529-30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)
(direct application of Calhoun test); Graham v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 32 Bankr. 978, 985 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983).
195. Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), No. 90-3258 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1990) (LEXIS,
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other circuits remain split, enthusiasm for the Calhoun test has waned in recent
years. 196
The Eleventh Circuit, most notably in the 1985 case of Harrell v. Sharp (In
re Harrell),197 has been the strongest critic of the present circumstances test,
unequivocally refuting that the present circumstances of either former spouse
should play a role in determining dischargeability. Unlike Calhoun, which ad-
dressed classification of continuing liability to a former spouse pursuant to an
assumption of joint marital debts,198 Harrell dealt with accrued alimony and
child support arrearages, as well as the debtor's agreement to pay his son's fu-
ture post-majority educational expenses. 199
The bankruptcy court in Harrell had found that the debt representing ali-
mony arrearages unquestionably had been in the nature of support at its crea-
tion.2°° Relying on Warner, however, the bankruptcy court held that the debt
had lost its support characteristics because of changed circumstances, because
the wife had remarried and no longer depended upon her former husband for
support. 20 1 Although the bankruptcy court noted that the exception from dis-
charge for support debts would be subverted if debtors were allowed merely to
wait for their former spouses to remarry in order to avoid their support obliga-
tions, it concluded that the fresh start policy overrode such concerns in certain
factual contexts.20 2 Because the child support arrearages and the agreement to
pay educational expenses were unaffected by the wife's remarriage, the bank-
ruptcy court found those obligations non-dischargeable; however, it recalculated
the amount of the debtor's continuing obligation on those debts and indicated
Genfed Library, USAPP file); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick
v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986);
Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1985); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d
681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984).
196. See infra notes 243-252 and accompanying text.
197. 754 F.2d 902 (1lth Cir. 1985).
198. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
199. The spouses in Harrell had entered into a 1971 separation agreement that required the
debtor to pay his former wife $100 per month for her support and maintenance until her death or
remarriage, and $100 per month as child support until their son became self-supporting, married, or
reached age 21. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 903. The amounts were to fluctuate according to the debtor's
income. He also agreed to pay his son's educational expenses for college and post-graduate educa-
tion, with a reduction in child support during periods in which he paid educational expenses. The
debtor further assumed the couple's joint debts and responsibility for mortgage payments on the
residence awarded to the wife. Id. Although by 1974, the debtor's salary had increased to the extent
that he would have been required to pay $400 a month for each support obligation, id. at 903 n.1, by
that time he was substantially in arrears and the agreement was amended to reduce both support
payments to $200 a month each. Id. at 903. The wife agreed to waive the arrearages in considera-
tion of the debtor's agreement to establish a trust for the son's educational expenses, but the debtor
failed to establish that trust. Id.
200. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 23 Bankr. 423, 424 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 33 Bankr. 989 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).
201. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 33 Bankr. 989, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 902
(11th Cir. 1985).
202. In Harrell, the wife was a CPA with an anticipated 1982 income of $30,000, was married,
and co-owned a house with a mortgage of $52,000. She and her new husband had a net worth of
about $42,000. Harrell, 23 Bankr. at 424. The former husband earned approximately $24,000 a
year, had living expenses of $1,300 per month, and was subject to certain tax liabilities arising out of
a business, plus legal expenses arising from the tax obligation and the bankruptcy action. Id. at 425.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that his son could seek an increase of that award if the debtor's financial condi-
tion improved. 20 3
The district court reversed both the bankruptcy court's discharge of the
alimony arrearages and its translation of the agreement to pay educational ex-
penses into specific terms, holding that the bankruptcy court's inquiry must end
upon classification of the debt.2°4 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, 205 rejecting an application of a present needs test under either a
Warner or Calhoun type analysis.20 6 The Eleventh Circuit offered three grounds
for its rejection of the present circumstances test: (1) the statutory language of
section 523(a)(5); (2) the legislative history of the support exception; and (3) the
policy of deferring to state courts in domestic relations matters.
First, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Harrell interpreted
the statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code to require only a determination
of whether the denomination of an obligation as support accurately reflects its
true nature:
The statutory language suggests a simple inquiry as to whether the
obligation can legitimately be characterized as support, that is,
whether it is in the nature of support. The language does not suggest a
precise inquiry into financial circumstances to determine precise levels
of need or support; nor does the statutory language contemplate an
ongoing assessment of need as circumstances change.20 7
Although the Harrell court declared that the statutory language clearly ne-
gates examination of present circumstances, the statute does not explicitly re-
quire that interpretation. Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge a marital
debt only where "such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support. '' 208 The use of the present tense, "is," supports Calhoun's implicit
conclusion that the statute directs discharge of support-related debts unless they
are currently in the nature of support at the time discharge is sought, that is,
when the bankruptcy petition is filed. No other clues are provided by the ex-
press language of the statute.
The Harrell court also read the legislative history of section 523(a)(5) as
supporting its interpretation of the statutory language. It concluded that Con-
gress had resolved the conflicting policies in favor of the debtor's dependents
when it enacted the exception from discharge, making it inappropriate for the
203. The separation agreement stipulated that the husband would provide "the most excellent
and suitable education within the husband's means" for the son. Id. At the bankruptcy proceeding
he offered to pay $300 a month, a figure the court found "reasonable" and in "good faith." Id. The
court noted that if the debtor's economic situation improved, the son might seek an increase. Id. at
426.
204. Harrell, 33 Bankr. at 995.
205. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir. 1985).
206. After first declaring that the absence of a state-law duty is not determinative of the nature
of an obligation for bankruptcy purposes, id. at 904-05 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 6319), the Harrell
court interpreted Calhoun as not expressly requiring inquiry into present circumstances: "Calhoun
does not expressly require consideration of present need." Id. at 906.
207. Id. (emphasis in original).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
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courts to balance the equities of an individual case. 209 Rather, the court con-
cluded, Congress intended only a process of distinguishing support from prop-
erty division.210
The final congressional reports,2 11 however, did not address the issue of the
appropriate time for analyzing a debt to determine its nature for bankruptcy
purposes. Instead, Congress merely clarified that federal law would control clas-
sification of marital debts and that hold-harmless agreements would be nondis-
chargeable when such provisions, in fact, fell within the federal definition of
support.2 12 The legislative history, therefore, adds little towards resolving the
present circumstances controversy. 2 13
Finally, the Harrell court further relied on principles of comity to reinforce
its conclusion that present circumstances are not relevant to determining dis-
chargeability. 214 Noting that state courts commonly permit modification of sup-
port obligations upon demonstrating a change of circumstances, 215 the rourt
decided that such an inquiry by bankruptcy courts would "embroil federal
courts in domestic relations matters which should properly be reserved to the
state courts. '2 16 While the financial equities of the parties may be important,
the federal courts are not the proper forum to resolve them.2 17 Thus, a bank-
ruptcy court should limit its involvement in state domestic relations issues, con-
fining its inquiry to the "narrow issue" of whether an individual obligation is
209. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906 n.6.
210. Id. at 906-07 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 6319).
211. The part of the report addressing paragraph (5) states, in its entirety:
Paragraph (5) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or child. This language,
in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security Act (43 U.S.C.
656(b)) by section 327 of the bill, will apply to make nondischargeable only alimony, main-
tenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent. See Hearings, pt. 2, at 942.
What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bank-
ruptcy laws, not State law. Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974);
Hearings, pt. 3, at 1308-10, are overruled, and the result in cases such as Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah
2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1952) is followed. This provision will, however, make nondischarge-
able any debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harm-
less on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance,
or support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerations that are simi-
lar to considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay money to a spouse is actu-
ally alimony or a property settlement. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 1287-90.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 6320.
212. See Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1983); Williams v.
Williams (In re Williams), 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983); Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661
F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1981); Petoske v. Petoske (In re Petoske), 16 Bankr. 412, 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982).
213. Commentators have remarked that flexible rules of statutory construction permit "the judi-
ciary to construct a congressional intent that comports with any judge's view on an issue" and have
questioned "whether Congress forms any intent at all when it enacts a piece of legislation." Klee &
Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2,
3 (1988).
214. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907.
215. Id. at 907 n.8.
216. Id. at 907.
217. Id.
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actually in the nature of support.213 Upon determining that a payment pos-
sesses that essential nature, the role of the bankruptcy court ends.219 Harrell's
policy argument is its strongest rationale for its rejection of the present circum-
stances test.
Although the factual contexts of Calhoun and Harrell are clearly distin-
guishable, Harrell is firm in its holding that present circumstances should be
deemed irrelevant, in any form and under any conditions, in classifying a debt
for bankruptcy purposes. 220 Other federal circuits have agreed. 22 1
In rejecting a present circumstances test in 1984, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit simply concluded that "the bankruptcy court does not ex-
amine the present situation of the parties."' 222 Several lower courts within the
Eighth Circuit questioned their own jurisdiction to modify state court
awards, 2 2 3 and in 1986, in Draper v. Draper,224 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its rejection of a present circumstances test.225 With-
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Within the Eleventh Circuit, see also Graves v. Hart (In re Graves), 69 Bankr. 626, 628
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (following Harrell); Myers v. Myers (In re Myers), 61 Bankr. 891, 896
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (same); Delaine v. Delalne (In re Delaine), 56 Bankr. 460, 464-66 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1985) (same).
221. Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), No. 90-3258 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, USAPP file); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick
v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986);
Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984).
222. Boyle, 724 F.2d at 683.
223. See Booth v. Booth (In re Booth), 44 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (no reference to
Boyle, decided earlier that year). The court in Booth first questioned whether the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction to reform a state court decree that the debtor alleged was based on fraud or mistake.
Id. at 675-76. Declining to interpret the decree contrary to its express provisions, the court refused
to modify the amount of the obligation, holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at
677 (relying on Marathon Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Northern Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)). The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 amended the Bankruptcy Code to
provide that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to "hear and determine all cases under title 11 and
all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 ... and may enter
appropriate orders and judgments." Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353 title I sec. 101(a), 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)
(1988)). A dischargeability determination is defined as a "core proceeding" under § 157(b)(2)(I). 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (1988). See generally Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdic-
tion: The Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 1
(1985) (criticizing the 1984 amendments); Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56
UMKC L. REv. 47 (1987) (discussing the constitutionality of bankruptcy jurisdiction granted by the
1984 amendments); Schwartzberg, The Retreat from Pervasive Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Court, 7
BANKR. DEvs. J. 1 (1990) (advocating the conferral of article III status on bankruptcy courts to
ensure the reestablishment of pervasive jurisdiction). A federal district court and several bankruptcy
courts in the Eighth Circuit followed Booth's reasoning. See Mathes v. Mathes (In re Mathes), 58
Bankr. 4, 6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985); Holcer v. Earl (In re Earl), 55 Bankr. 12, 15 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985); Gebhardt v. Gebhardt (In re Gebhardt), 53 Bankr. 113, 115 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see also
Schultz v. Mitchell-Huron Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Schultz), 69 Bankr. 629 (D.S.D.) (only question
is whether debt constituted support), appeal dismissed, 837 F.2d 481 (8h Cir.1987); Hague v. Hague
(In re Hague), 57 Bankr. 511, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (state court should make dischargeability
determination, applying federal standards).
224. 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
225. Id. at 54; cf. Gebhardt, 53 Bankr. at 115 (bankruptcy court must look to circumstances at
creation of debts and may not reform instrument). But cf Winders v. Winders (In re Winders), 60
Bankr. 746, 748 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (only a portion of payments due to wife "recharacterized"
as support).
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out further analysis, the Draper court decided to follow Harrell. It denied any
relevancy of the parties' present circumstances, and rejected the debtor's argu-
ment that a "needs" test should be applied to determine the nature of terms of a
settlement agreement in which he had contracted to pay certain of his children's
educational, medical, and dental expenses. 226
In the Second Circuit, several bankruptcy courts initially indicated that
present circumstances could be a relevant factor in determining the nature of a
debt.22 7 However, in the 1987 case of Forsdick v. Turgeon, 228 the Second Cir-
cuit also decided to follow Harrell. The Forsdick court, while acknowledging
the strong bankruptcy policy of affording a debtor a fresh start, agreed that Con-
gress already had considered the competing interests of the debtor and his de-
pendents and decided in favor of the latter-a choice that the federal courts have
no option but to accept.229 The Forsdick court enjoined disruption of state fam-
ily law mechanisms absent "an unmistakable mandate from Congress to do so in
order to achieve a valid federal objective." '230
The Forsdick court also contrasted section 523(a)(5) with section
523(a)(8), 231 which categorizes certain student loans as nondischargeable unless
"excepting such debt from discharge... will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents. ' 232 Although another court has noted that
226. Draper, 790 F.2d at 54. The Arkansas state court had previously held that those terms
were contractual and therefore not modifiable under state law. See id. at 53. Because the debtor had
remarried and his financial situation had changed, he then sought a reduction in his payments,
which the bankruptcy court had concluded were child support. Id. at 53-54.
227. See Lewis v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 39 Bankr. 842, 845 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) ("a promise
to indemnify on joint third party debt, which debt is unrelated to past or present health, shelter or
related support needs, would not survive"); Migliarese v Migliarese (In re Migliarese), 38 Bankr.
978, 980 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (portion of support award not yet due at time of wife's remarriage
dischargeable). But see Aurre v. Kalaigan (In re Aurre), 60 Bankr. 621, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(action to declare arrearages dischargeable barred by res judicata).
228. 812 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1987).
229. Id. at 804.
230. Id. (Application of a present circumstances test "would turn this legislative intent on its
head by having the bankruptcy court entertain arguments about, and deciding issues of dis-
chargeability on the basis of, a continuing need for support instead of protecting the award previ-
ously found by the state courts to be appropriate.")
231. Id. (citing Benz v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 20 Bankr. 1008, 1011 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)); see
supra text accompanying notes 139-40; see also Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 79 Bankr. 633, 639
(Bankr. D. Md. 1987) ("lIt is abundantly clear when considering the language of §§ 523(a)(5)(B)
and 523(a)(8)(B) side by side that Congress did not intend anything other than an absolute discharge
in § 523(a)(5).").
232. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988). Section 523(a)(8) excepts from discharge debts "for an educa-
tional loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution." Id. In addition to the
"hardship" proviso in subsection (B), subsection (A) permits discharge of loans that "first became
due before five years ... before the date of the filing of the petition." Id. § 523(a)(8)(B). The Code
itself neither defines "undue hardship" nor provides a test for its determination. The courts have
developed several standards, however. Many courts apply a strict standard, requiring the debtor to
prove unique or extraordinary hardship. See, eg., Cahill v. Norstar Bank of Upstate New York (In
re Cahill), 93 Bankr. 8, 13 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988); Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v.
Bowen (In re Bowen), 37 Bankr. 171, 172 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); Love v. United States (In re
Love), 33 Bankr. 753, 754-55 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); Abrams v. University of Nebraska at Lincoln
(In re Abrams), 19 Bankr. 64, 66 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). Other courts have been more lenient. See,
eg., Yarber v. Department of Health Educ. & Welfare, 19 Bankr. 18, 20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982);
In re Fonzo, 1 Bankr. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979). Several courts have adopted a "mechanical
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the "reasonableness" inquiry of the present circumstances test is not equivalent
to "undue hardship" in the student loan exception,233 the Forsdick court inter-
preted the absence of such a qualification in section 523(a)(5) as an "absolute
exception" to discharge.234 Significantly, the Forsdick court further refused to
create an exception for cases in which modification is unavailable in the state
court.235 Instead, the court found the nonmodifiability of certain support
awards in state courts representative of a state policy decision-a domestic rela-
tions area upon which it refused to encroach.236 The Second Circuit concluded
that the nature of the award at the time of its creation conclusively establishes its
nature for bankruptcy. 237
The Tenth Circuit joined the growing majority of courts rejecting the pres-
ent circumstances test in 1989 in Sylvester v. Sylvester.238 After concluding that
the debts owed to the wife met the relevant criteria for classification as sup-
port,239 the Tenth Circuit rejected the debtor's Calhoun arguments as a minority
approach that it declined to follow.2 4° The Sylvester court found no basis for a
test," ascertaining the debtor's sources and likely sources of income during the life of the educational
debts and the extent to which the debtor and his dependents will be able to maintain a minimum
standard of living if repayment of the debt is required. See, e.g., Erickson v. North Dakota State
Univ. (In re Erickson), 52 Bankr. 154, 157 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Cossette v. Higher Educ. Assist-
ance Found. (In re Cossette), 41 Bankr. 689, 691 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). The debtor's good faith
may play a critical role. See, eg., Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birden (In re
Birden), 17 Bankr. 891, 894 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16
Bankr. 128, 130-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). Under any test, the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States suggested that the primary consideration should be the debtor's financial
condition. H. REP. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 174, 177 (1973). The courts gener-
ally consider the debtor's unearned income or accumulated assets, his prospects for obtaining or
retaining steady employment, the income expected from such employment, the debtor's necessary
family expenses at a minimal standard of living, and any excess available for payment on the educa-
tional debt. See Annotation, Bankruptcy Discharge of Student Loan on Ground of Undue Hardship
Under § 523(a)(8)(B) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 523(a)(8)(B), 63 A.L.R. FED. 570,
574 (1983). The previous version of the statute also contained an "undue hardship" exception. See
20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976). Therefore, cases decided under that statute apply as precedent to
controversies under current § 523(a)(8).
233. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 240, 784 P.2d 420, 427 (1989).
234. Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1987).
235. Although Forsdick questioned Harrell's comments regarding the availability of a state
court remedy, none of the earlier cases had been determined exclusively on that basis. Id. It should
be noted, in contrast to § 523(a)(8), that alternate remedies are available to the debtor who has
incurred student loans. Federal regulations allow deferral of both principal and interest under speci-
fied circumstances, 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.34 to .37, 682.210 (1990) (deferment for specified times for,
inter alia, military or foreign or domestic service programs, disability, or service as medical or simi-
lar internship); forbearance in others, 34 C.F.R. § 682.211 (1990) (temporary cessation of payments,
time extensions, or reduction of scheduled payments for poor health, other personal problems); and
cancellation of all or portions of the loan in still others, 34 C.F.R. § 674.51 to .58 (1990) (cancella-
tion for, eg., public school teaching, military service, disability, or death). No alternative federal
remedy exists for relief from a support debt, nor, in many instances, will the debtor be able to obtain
state court relief from nondischarged obligations. See infra notes 270-83 and accompanying text.
236. Forsdick, 812 F.2d at 804.
237. Id.
238. 865 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
239. Id. at 1166 (relying on Goin v. Rives (In re Goin), 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987) and
Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir 1986)).
240. In Sylvester the debtor had agreed in 1969 to make certain payments to and for the benefit
of his former wife and their child in recognition of the wife's contributions to the husband's medical
education and training. Id. at 1165. The wife sought to enforce those commitments through a state
court contempt proceeding when the husband filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy action in 1984. Id. On
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present circumstances test in either the language or the history of the exception
from discharge, observing that "such an inquiry would put federal courts in the
position of modifying state matrimonial decrees. '24 1 It refused "to make such
an intrusion into the area of domestic relations absent a clearer congressional
mandate to do so."242
Most recently, the Third Circuit also expressly rejected Calhoun's present
circumstances test in Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), noting that exami-
nation of a former spouse's continued need would "serve essentially as a penalty
for a former spouse who may have struggled to gain self-sufficiency." 2 43
Although bankruptcy courts in that circuit had been divided,2 44 a federal dis-
trict court in 1989 described the majority position as being "clearly superior"
and observed:
To allow a bankruptcy court to take into consideration the par-
ties' changed financial circumstances in determining whether an obli-
gation constitutes [support] would be to rule that such agreements are
dischargeable in nearly every case. In most cases, by the time the
debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the economic condition of his or her
ex-spouse will be at least on par with, if not more favorable than, that
of the debtor, who, after all, has been driven to bankruptcy by his
debts. The debtor's proper remedy in this case is not to avoid this debt
through bankruptcy, but to petition to the court with jurisdiction over
his or her divorce decree for a modification of any such agreement in
light of changed circumstances. 245
The viability of the present circumstances test is uncertain in the remaining
federal circuits. Although the bankruptcy cases within the First,24 6 Fourth,
247
the husband's complaint to the bankruptcy court, that court found the obligations to be nondis-
chargeable. Id. When the federal district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, the hus-
band appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
241. Id. at 1166.
242. Id.
243. No. 90-3258 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, USAPP file).
244. Compare MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 Bankr. 259, 277-78 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986) (approved present circumstances test but found it inapplicable to the facts of the case)
with Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 94 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting present
circumstances test). The Jenkins court noted that while a specific debt may be part support and part
property division, determination of actual amounts is a task for the state courts:
[S]uch a limited approach might, on occasion, result in the nondischargeability of a debt
beyond what an objective bankruptcy observer would conclude was sufficient to meet the
needs of the non-debtor spouse. Yet a more expansive role exceeds congressional intent (to
the extent discernable from the legislative history), differs from the longstanding approach
under the former Act, undermines comity considerations and threatens to convert this
bankruptcy forum into a federal domestic relations court. If the original state court award
was excessive, it may be addressed by a state court appeal. If the circumstances of the
parties change warranting an adjustment of the obligation, state law allows a party to re-
quest a modification.
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
245. Chedrick v. Chedrick (In re Chedrick), 98 Bankr. 731, 734 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
246. Compare Altavilla v. Altavilla (In re Altavilla), 40 Bankr. 938, 941 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984)
(adopting Calhoun intent test and noting that relevant factors in determining intent include "relative
earning powers of the parties, both at the time of the divorce and thereafter" (emphasis added)) with
Rosell v. Gibson (In re Gibson), 61 Bankr. 997, 999 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) ("[i]t is important to note
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Fifth,24 8 and Seventh 249 Circuits have conflicted, the more recent decisions indi-
cate a trend toward its rejection. A primary rationale for rejecting the test is the
concept that modification of a debt by a bankruptcy court would undermine
state interests and authority.2 50 One court concluded that not only is the bank-
ruptcy court ill-equipped to determine a reasonable amount of support, but such
a determination would demand that the matter remain open for reconsideration
upon future changes in circumstances. 251 Another court has observed that the
split of authority results from a difference in perspective: the Sixth Circuit ap-
proach concentrates on the debtor, emphasizing the federal policy of providing a
fresh start, while the majority position focuses on the debtor's dependents and
"the expressed federal policy of a [sic] favoring the continuing enforceability of
familial obligations."'252
Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative history is conclu-
sive in resolving the controversy over the present circumstances test,2 53 the an-
swer to the dilemma must be based on policy. If the federal courts are to defer
... that subsequent transactions or changes in conditions effecting the parties have no bearing upon
the decision") (emphasis altered)).
247. See Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 79 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 98 Bankr. 243
(1988); see also West v. West (In re West), 95 Bankr. 395, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (where state
divorce court's clarification of marital obligation indicates intent, no need to consider additional
factors; not the role of bankruptcy court to rewrite decree). But see Boyd-Leopard v. Douglass (In
re Boyd-Leopard), 40 Bankr. 651, 656 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984) (obligation to pay second mortgage on
residence no longer constitutes support when former spouse no longer resides in home).
248. See Smith v. Smith (In re Smith), 114 Bankr. 457, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1990) (rejects
"minority" Calhoun approach); Jackson v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 102 Bankr. 524, 531-32 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1989) (stating court not bound to any test or factors); In re Smith, 97 Bankr. 326, 330
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (bankruptcy court not proper forum to reexamine divorce arrangements);
Levy v. Levy (In re Levy), 63 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 61 Bankr.
171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). Contra Sullivan v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan), 62 Bankr. 465, 472-74
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986) (portion of child support award is manifestly unreasonable in light of
present circumstances and therefore partially dischargeable); Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48
Bankr. 874, 876-77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (adopts Calhoun test but finds no change in circum-
stances since divorce decree). See generally Comment, Alimony and Child Support, supra note 8
(providing an overview of the dischargeability of family support obligations in the Fifth Circuit,
including a review of the conflicting policies in bankruptcy and domestic relations law).
249. See Fryman v. Wendt (In re Fryman), 67 Bankr. 112, 113-14 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986)
(arrearages on child support not dischargeable despite wife's remarriage and children's attaining age
of majority); see also Penn v. Penn, No. 88 C 10704 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 26, 1989) (WESTLAW,
FBKR-CS 91748) (although court cited Calhoun favorably with respect to factors indicating intent,
Calhoun not followed to extent "inconsistent with Seventh Circuit law"). But see Chambers v.
Chambers (In re Chambers), 36 Bankr. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (need for support deter-
mined at time bankruptcy petition filed, although court need not balance present financial circum-
stances of parties in determining nature of debt owed to third party).
250. See Fryman, 67 Bankr. at 113; Levy, 63 Bankr. at 451; Booth v. Booth (In re Booth), 44
Bankr. 674, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
251. Levy, 63 Bankr. at 451. The Levy court believed that a present circumstances evaluation is
inappropriate for reasons of both comity and practicality, despite the likelihood that the debtor
would have no state court recourse because of the nonmodifiability of his contractual obligation. Id.
252. Jackson v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 102 Bankr. 524, 532 n.13 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1989). In
an extensive footnote, the Jackson court criticized the Calhoun approach, suggesting that an inquiry
into present circumstances requires the bankruptcy court "in fact to sit as a surrogate state family
court to monitor the substantive propriety of state court awards," in what would amount to a "full-
blown state court alimony trial." Id.
253. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
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to the state courts on issues relating to the modification of support, it is instruc-
tive to examine the impact of bankruptcy on state court modification actions.
IV. THE IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY ON STATE COURT
MODIFICATION ACTIONS
A. Upsetting the Balance of Need and Ability
When bankruptcy has disrupted the financial balance between former
spouses, one of them is likely to bring a state court modification action shortly
thereafter.254 A bankruptcy that occurred prior to divorce is not relevant, be-
cause modification requires evidence of a change of circumstances since the pre-
vious support hearing.255 Similarly, courts have refused to hear a motion for
modification until bankruptcy proceedings are completed.256 However, a bank-
ruptcy discharge granted subsequent to divorce frequently is a factor in deter-
mining whether modification is appropriate. The mere fact that bankruptcy has
occurred does not in itself compel modification, although it may be a significant
factor,257 and, as in all modification actions, a trial judge is afforded considera-
ble discretion in determining whether a modification of support should be au-
thorized in light of bankruptcy.2 58
254. Bankruptcy may also be a consideration in a contempt action. The typical situation occurs
when the nonbankrupt spouse alleges that the debtor should be held in contempt of court for failure
to pay spousal or child support and the debtor defends by arguing that his obligation was discharged
in the bankruptcy case. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 784 P.2d 420 (1989). Alternatively,
because inability to comply with a court order is a defense to a contempt action, the debtor may
allege that his bankruptcy is evidence that he was unable to pay the debt at the time it was due.
Compare Patterson v. Gartman, 439 So. 2d 171, 173 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (obligor may be held in
contempt for willful refusal to pay support, despite decrease in income and bankruptcy) with Hop-
kins, 109 N.M. 233, 784 P.2d 420; Brown v. Brown, 670 S.W. 2d 167, 171 (Mo. App. 1984) (bank-
ruptcy is factor in avoiding contempt charges).
255. See McCarthy v. McCarthy, 225 Ga. 326, 327, 168 S.E.2d 164, 165-66 (1969); cf. Neier v.
Neier (In re Neier), 45 Bankr. 740, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (marital debt arising from post-
bankruptcy divorce decree not discharged). See generally Fibich & Floyd, supra note 8, at 643-46
(discussing the pursuit of divorce after bankruptcy filed); Robbins, The Advantages of a Timely
Bankruptcy, 5 FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1983, at 14 (instructing attorneys on how best to coordinate
divorce litigation with a bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
256. See Broussard v. Norris, 470 So. 2d 399, 401 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (modification case re-
manded for reconsideration after termination of bankruptcy action because outcome could effect
change of circumstances); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 432 N.W.2d 860, 863 (N.D. 1988) (modification
action dismissed until final Chapter 11 plan approved). But see Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934, 938
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (modification of child support upheld despite father's filing bankruptcy peti-
tion). Although the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides that collection of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support is not barred, the provision prohibits placement of a lien on debtor's real estate as
security for a property settlement. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988), amended by Act of June 25, 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-31, 104 Stat. 267; see Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); see
generally White, Spousal and Child Support, supra note 8, at 373 (relationship of automatic stay to
collection of support actions).
257. Murphy v. Murphy, 491 So. 2d 978, 980 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (existence of bankruptcy is
considered in modification proceeding but does not mandate modification); Fibner v. Ribner, 6
Conn. App. 98, 104, 503 A.2d 612, 616 (1986) (bankruptcy a significant but not conclusive factor in
request for modification as husband's condition actually improved after bankruptcy).
258. See, eg., Patterson, 439 So. 2d at 173 (modification of support decree based on changed
circumstances is within sound discretion of trial court and should be reversed only for plain abuse of
discretion); Wier v. Wier, 410 So. 2d 78, 81 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (same), overruled in part on other
grounds, Bayliss v. Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 994 (Ala. 1989).
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The bankruptcy of the support obligor may justify either an upward or
downward adjustment of the support obligation, depending on the totality of the
circumstances. In some cases, the debtor's bankruptcy may be persuasive evi-
dence of his decreased ability to pay the previously ordered amount of support,
justifying a reduction of future payments. 25 9 Totally ignoring the debtor's bank-
ruptcy may constitute error.26° On occasion, bankruptcy may even be consid-
ered an appropriate factor in reducing arrearages as well as future support.2 61
However, when an obligor pleads his bankruptcy as grounds for reducing a sup-
port order, state courts frequently will consider the obligor's earning potential,
rather than his current financial status.262 Furthermore, the fact that bank-
ruptcy is a voluntary action may work against the debtor who seeks a reduction
in support. 263
The debtor's bankruptcy also may result in granting the former spouse's
motion for an increase in support on a temporary or permanent basis. The re-
cipient's need for support may have risen if that spouse suffered financial rever-
sals because of the other's bankruptcy.2 64 For example, the recipient spouse
259. See Deaton v. Deaton, 393 So. 2d 408, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (husband's uncontroverted
evidence of personal and corporate bankruptcy along with other factors warranted reduction,
although court reserved plaintiff wife's right to petition for increase if husband's financial situation
improved); Streitz v. Streitz, 363 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (bankruptcy is factor
demonstrating material change in circumstances entitling debtor to reduction); Cook v. Cook, 364
N.W.2d 74, 78 (N.D. 1985) (although ability not necessarily permanently impaired because of bank-
ruptcy, unlikely that debtor could have borrowed funds to make original payment); cf. McKeever v.
McKeever, 486 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (bankruptcy might have relieved husband of
portion of support obligation had he not undertaken new obligations).
260. Siravo v. Siravo, 424 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 1981).
261. See Streitz, 363 N.W. at 138 (bankruptcy is one factor in determining father's nonwillfui
failure to pay child support and can lead to reduction of arrearages); see also Morovitz v. Morovitz,
743 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (trial court abused discretion in assessing arrearages
for child support without consideration of bankruptcy stipulation between parties and trustee in
bankruptcy), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1822 (1990); cf. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 344 N.W.2d 892, 896
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (despite debtor's declaration of bankruptcy, trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to forgive debtor's child support arrearages).
262. See Davis v. Davis, 518 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Patterson, 439 So. 2d at 173-
74; Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 704, 373 S.E.2d 312, 315 (1988); see also Murphy v. Murphy,
491 So. 2d 978, 980 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (lack of actual earnings or filing for bankruptcy do not
necessarily warrant modification).
263. See Harris, 91 N.C. App. at 705, 373 S.E.2d at 316 (voluntary bankruptcy, under a Chapter
11 reorganization, may not be used to avoid child support nor to reduce the amount owed; debtor
may be held in contempt).
264. See Kilby v. Kilby, 500 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (temporary modification of
alimony and permanent increase of child support authorized where husband's bankruptcy caused
wife to suffer financial reversals and affected children's standard of living); Kruse v. Kruse, 464
N.E.2d 934, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (husband's bankruptcy caused foreclosure procedure on wife's
home, justifying increase of child support; husband's net pay and wife's expenses both increased);
Foster v. Childers, 416 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (change in circumstances because of
husband's bankruptcy may warrant modification of original decree); Siegel v. Siegel, 243 N.J. Super.
211, 214, 578 A.2d 1269, 1270-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (increase in alimony appropriate
to compensate for loss of income from deferral of property settlement payment during husband's
bankruptcy action); Eckert v. Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d 770, 773-74, 424 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (fixed term maintenance extended indefinitely because of substantial detrimental change in
financial circumstances of the parties caused by husband's bankruptcy), rev. denied, 145 Wis. 2d 916,
430 N.W.2d 351 (Wis. 1988); see also Simpkins v. Simpkins, 435 So. 2d 753, 754 (Ala. Civ. App.
1983) (temporary increase in child support did not represent abuse of discretion where wife's finan-
cial condition was depressed after she incurred liability on loan discharged by husband's
bankruptcy).
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may be required to pay debts owed to third parties, which the debtor had agreed
to pay before his discharge, and therefore may have less ability to support herself
or the parties' children.265 Furthermore, discharge of other debts in bankruptcy
may reduce demands on the debtor's income. His ability to support his family
may actually be enhanced, defeating his plea for a reduction of his support obli-
gation, 266 or bolstering the recipient's motion for an increase in support. 267
Bankruptcy by the recipient spouse similarly may upset the balance of need
and ability, justifying a modification of support. The recipient's own bankruptcy
may be a factor indicating increased need and warranting an elevation in sup-
port from a former spouse.268 Conversely, the support recipient's own bank-
ruptcy, which discharged her other debts, may improve her financial condition
to the extent that her former husband is entitled to a reduction of support, espe-
cially if he became directly responsible for payment of those debts.2 69 Thus, the
effect of bankruptcy in a modification action depends upon its overall impact on
the parties' financial situation.
B. No Reinstatement or Offset
Discharge of a debt in bankruptcy extinguishes the debtor's liability and
forbids the creditor from taking any action "to collect, recover or offset any such
debt."'270 Thus, once a bankruptcy court has determined that a marital debt is
dischargeable, the supremacy clause and principles of comity preclude the state
265. See, eg., Simpkins, 435 So. 2d at 754 (child support increase permitted when mother re-
quired to pay debt that father had assumed, which was later discharged); In re Myers, 54 Wash.
App. 233, 239-40, 773 P.2d 118, 122 (1989) (wife's needs increased because of liability on debts
assumed by husband and discharged in his bankruptcy; increase in spousal support authorized).
266. Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); see also Roan v. Roan, 504 So.
2d 1220, 1221 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (elimination of personal indebtedness through bankruptcy
weighed against reduction in child support); Gaines v. Gaines, 106 Ill. App. 2d 9, 13, 245 N.E.2d
574, 577 (1969) (discharge in bankruptcy does not diminish debtor's ability to make support pay-
ments because the discharge "relieves him of debts and thereby strengthens his financial position").
267. Coakley v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Horcasitas v. House, 75
N.M. 317, 320, 404 P.2d 140, 142 (1965); Strauss v. Strauss, 619 S.W.2d 18, 19 C(ex. Ct. App. 1981).
268. See In re Loomis, 153 Ill. App. 3d 404, 405, 408, 505 N.E.2d 766, 7671, 769 (1987) (wife's
bankruptcy and loss of home constituted change of circumstances warranting increase in her support
from husband). Similarly, the bankruptcy of a third party who owes the recipient spouse money
may affect a recipient's need for support from a former spouse. See Gardner v. Gardner, 391
N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (bankruptcy of party to contract assigned to recipient
spouse as part of divorce settlement constitutes substantial detrimental change in financial circum-
stances and may justify increase in child support payments).
269. See Clements v. Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 746, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (1982)
(husband entitled to decrease in spousal support requirements because wife's indebtedness was re-
duced and husband's obligation to creditor was increased by her discharge); Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d
774, 781 (Wyo. 1986) (wife's discharge of debts, which she had assumed at divorce, may constitute a
change of circumstances sufficient to reduce the husband's support obligation).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) provides:
A discharge in a case under this title-
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, from property of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived ....
I I U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1988).
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court from reexamining the nature of that debt.27 1 Nor may a state court
amend or modify a divorce decree to reinstate a discharged debt. Thus, the
nonbankrupt spouse may have no remedy in a subsequent state court action and
may be compelled to absorb the financial loss. 272
Even when the recipient spouse fails to litigate the nature of a marital debt
in the bankruptcy action, some state courts construe the offset rule strictly, re-
garding themselves as powerless to modify a divorce decree to grant alimony.27 3
Although, under state law, when any amount of alimony has been reserved ini-
tially, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to alter and amend the award
upon a showing of changed circumstances, if no alimony had been ordered in the
original divorce decree, a final divorce decree cannot be modified to grant sup-
port.2 74 The issue of alimony is res judicata and later modification is precluded,
unless the movant is entitled to relief under appropriate rules of civil proce-
dure.275 The result of a modification proceeding following bankruptcy thus may
hinge on the verbal formula employed in the original divorce decree.
Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that a property division clearly was
granted in lieu of alimony, at least one court has found that it had no jurisdic-
tion to amend the decree.276 While noting that "[t]his unfortunate result may be
271. See Cohen v. Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1980); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500, 504 (RI. 1985); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 144 Vt. 549, 552, 491 A.2d 1044,
1046 (1984) (no collateral attack of bankruptcy court's determination of dischargeability).
272. See, eg., Williams v. Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 1227, 203 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917 (1984)
(trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering offset that had effect of modifying property settle-
ment); Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (federal remedy of discharge in bank-
ruptcy is exclusive and thereby precludes any type of state action that would interfere with its
outcome); Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (where no maintenance previ-
ously was awarded, trial court had no jurisdiction currently to award maintenance for any purpose);
Benavides v. Benavides, 99 N.M. 535, 538, 660 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1983) (final divorce decree that
incorporates property settlement including outstanding debts may not be modified after expiration of
statutory period for doing so).
273. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d at 413; Benavides, 99 N.M. at 538, 660 P.2d at 1020.
274. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing scope of court's jurisdiction on
matters of modification).
275. In the Benavides case, the couple had stipulated to a divorce settlement agreement that
recited "Alimony: None." Benavides, 99 N.M. at 536, 660 P.2d at 1018. Neither the stipulation nor
the divorce decree, which incorporated the agreement, mentioned a loan secured by a second mort-
gage on the family residence. Id. Within the same month as the divorce, the husband filed bank-
ruptcy, listing the loan in the bankruptcy petition and separately listing the wife as a creditor because
of their joint obligation on the loan. Id. In the bankruptcy action, the wife unsuccessfully attempted
to compel payment by the husband, asserting that he fraudulently induced her to execute the mort-
gage; however, she did not contest discharge under § 523(a)(5). Id. at 537-38, 660 P.2d at 1019-20.
Once the bankruptcy stay was lifted, allowing the wife to seek an increase in child support, she filed a
motion to increase child support and the trial court granted a modification of the divorce decree,
granting her an amount of support equal to the amount owed on the debt, on the basis that the
decree was inequitable because the divorce court had not been informed of the loan's existence. Id. at
536-37, 660 P.2d at 1018-19. On the husband's appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed,
holding that modification was precluded by res judicata when no alimony had been granted by the
original divorce decree. Id. at 536-37, 660 P.2d at 1020. Neither New Mexico Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 59, granting new trials, nor Rule 60, providing relief from judgments nor orders under desig-
nated conditions, was applicable, and, in this case, the trial court had not committed a mistake
pursuant to Rule 60(b), but properly acted on the information before it at the time because the
parties had knowingly concealed information about the debt. Id. at 539, 660 P.2d at 1020-21. The
wife was not entitled to relief based on the mistake of the parties when she and her then-husband
consciously chose the course of nondisclosure. Id. at 539, 660 P.2d at 1021.
276. Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In the Stolp case, the original
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harsh, but [it is] the law," 277 the court concluded that modifying the decree
would circumvent the bankruptcy court's discharge.
Even when the divorce decree expressly retained jurisdiction over spousal
support, one court, in Cohen v. Cohen,278 held that modification was precluded
after the debtor was discharged of his liability on marital debts. The Cohen
court reasoned that "the federal remedy of discharge in bankruptcy is exclusive
in the sense that the federal statutory scheme precludes any type of state action
which would interfere with its objectives." ' 279 Thus, the state court is precluded
from taking any action that would "either directly or indirectly, nullify the fed-
eral bankruptcy discharge of... part or all of the community indebtedness. '280
Attempts to draft provisions to avoid the consequences of bankruptcy also have
been thwarted. In Coakley v. Coakley28 1 the parties had foreseen the precise
possibility of the husband's bankruptcy and had included a provision in their
stipulated divorce decree that the court would retain jurisdiction to reopen the
judgment in that event.282 Nonetheless, the court later held that the stipulation
was an invalid attempt to waive bankruptcy rights.283
If, however, the original divorce decree properly is structured to reflect
some alimony, courts frequently have struggled to avoid the harsh results of
bankruptcy discharge. Although the court in Coakley found the stipulation that
purported to authorize modification of the property division provisions unen-
forceable, it achieved the desired result by permitting an increase in both spousal
divorce decree specifically stated that the wife was "not granted any maintenance and instead [was]
award[ed] a $10,500 property settlement to be paid in four installments over three years." Id. at 410.
The husband filed bankruptcy within the same year as the divorce; the wife never brought an action
in the bankruptcy court and the discharge of the debt to her was granted without objection. Id. In
the wife's later action for contempt, based on allegations that the husband had failed to pay child
support, the trial court granted her maintenance. Id. at 410-11. In reversing, the appellate court
held that because a property division is final, the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the prop-
erty settlement, observing that if some maintenance originally had been awarded, or if the divorce
court had reserved the issue for future determination rather than expressly waiving maintenance,
modification might have been appropriate. Id. at 412.
277. Id.
278. 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1980).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 400 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
282. Id. at 438. In Coakley the husband had already filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action at the
time of divorce. Foreseeing the possibility of his obtaining a discharge of his obligation to pay the
wife installment payments of her share of his pension, the couple's stipulated divorce judgment pro-
vided that "if [the husband] were to amend his petition to one for Chapter 7 liquidation relief, the
court would retain jurisdiction and either party could move for a reopening of the judgment on the
issues of property distribution, maintenance, and support." Subsequently, the husband converted his
bankruptcy action to Chapter 7 and, within two months of the divorce, was discharged of his obliga-
tion under the property settlement and of his liability on certain debts jointly owed to third parties.
Id.
283. Id. at 440. When both parties attempted to reopen the judgment, the trial court refused to
reopen the property provision, finding the stipulation an invalid attempt to waive bankruptcy rights.
Id. at 439. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed, noting that a waiver of bankruptcy rights is
enforceable only with respect to obligations in the nature of support. Id. at 440 (citing Watrous v.
George (In re George), 15 Bankr. 247, 249 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981)). The court further concurred
that the "imposition of a new property settlement ... would deny him the relief granted him by the
bankruptcy," and noted that both bankruptcy law and state law regard property settlements as final
and prevent the nonbankrupt spouse from recovering the losses suffered. Id.
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maintenance and child support because modification of support was authorized
by statute, even in the absence of an express agreement. 284 If any support was
awarded initially, that amount may be increased because of the change in cir-
cumstances associated with the bankruptcy action.285
Thus, although a discharged debt itself may not be offset or reinstated by a
state court, the nonbankrupt spouse may be compensated indirectly if the origi-
nal divorce decree was formulated appropriately. Despite potential frustration
of the debtor's fresh start bankruptcy discharge is recognized as a legitimate
factor in state court modification proceedings. 286
The Rhode Island Supreme Court went a step further in Hopkins v. Hop-
kins,2 87 holding that the state court was not precluded from reevaluating the
wife's express conditional waiver of alimony in the divorce decree. Although no
formal order for alimony had appeared in the original divorce decree, the court
reasoned that the then-effective Rhode Island statute288 permitted the trial court
to review and alter alimony awards and to make any related decree that could
have been made in the original suit.28 9 Thus, the Hopkins court concluded that
the original order of a payment to be made to a third party could be construed as
equivalent to an alimony award to the wife, and the husband's subsequent dis-
charge of direct liability to the third party creditor was a sufficient change of
circumstances to justify modification of the amount he owed the wife.290
Correspondingly, courts have reduced support obligations to offset indi-
rectly a recipient's discharge of debts for which the support obligor becomes
responsible.291 For example, in Clements v. Clements,292 the California Court of
284. Id. The court concluded that the results of the bankruptcy constituted a change of circum-
stances that would authorize the trial court, in its discretion, to increase maintenance and support.
Id. The court further held that the trial court had not erred in directing the debtor to pay arrearages
on mortgage and tax payments because there was no indication that the bankruptcy court was aware
of the existence of the debts. Id. at 441-42.
285. Id. at 440. In Eckert v. Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d 770,424 N.W.2d 759 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), the
court affirmed an extension of an eighteen-month maintenance award indefinitely when the hus-
band's discharge prevented the wife from receiving her share of the marital estate and caused her to
become directly liable for credit card debts assigned to the husband. Id. at 774-75, 424 N.W.2d at
761; see also Siegel v. Siegel, 243 NJ. Super. 211, 578 A.2d 1269 (1990) (increase in alimony granted
during pendency of bankruptcy action). Even when no spousal support had been entered in the
initial decree, courts have compensated a spouse indirectly by increasing child support. For exam-
ple, in Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), the court increased child support after
the husband had been discharged of his obligation on a second mortgage on the family home and a
lien on a van awarded to the wife in the divorce action. Id. at 937-38. The wife lost both the home
and van to creditors after the husband's discharge. Id. at 937. Dismissing the husband's assertion
that the increase in child support impermissibly converted the property settlement to alimony, the
Kruse court concluded that the husband had not been ordered to pay discharged debts, nor had the
trial court redetermined dischargeability. Id. Rather, the trial court had properly focused on the
status of the parties at the time of the petition for modification. Id. at 938.
286. See In re Danley, 14 Bankr. 493, 495 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981); Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d at 778-79,
424 N.W.2d at 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
287. 487 A.2d 500 (R.I. 1985).
288. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1981) (amended 1984).
289. Hopkins, 487 A.2d at 504.
290. Id.
291. See Clements v. Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 746, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (1982); Jones
v. Jones, 300 Minn. 182, 188-89, 220 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1974) (child support increased after wife
became liable for debt for which husband was discharged).
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Appeals affirmed a modification order that reduced a husband's spousal support
obligation after the wife was discharged of debts assigned to her in the divorce
action.293 The court recognized "two competing policy considerations": the
bankruptcy fresh start doctrine and the family law court's "strong interest in
requiring the bankrupt to fulfill obligations that are an indivisible part of the
equal division of community property."2 94 Thus, the court implicitly acknowl-
edged the inextricable interrelationship between support and property division.
It observed that although the wife's assumption of indebtedness could not have
been construed to be "in the nature of alimony or support" because the husband
was in a considerably better financial position,295 reduction of the husband's
support obligation was proper because the wife's need was reduced to the extent
of her discharge, while the husband's obligations to third party creditors in-
creased proportionately.296
Likewise, although a former husband is enjoined from directly and unilater-
ally offsetting the amount for which he became responsible because of the wife's
discharge, the change in circumstances may justify modification of child sup-
port.2 97 Even when no direct spousal support has been ordered, the custodial
parent might benefit indirectly from the child support and that award may be
modified when the resulting liability upsets the balance of the parties' financial
situation.298
At the same time, when no express support is ordered in the initial decree,
the payor spouse may have no remedy when the payments he owes the bankrupt
spouse represent a property division. Although the bankrupt spouse has been
292. 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1982).
293. Id. at 746, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 761. The facts of Clements were appealing: after the last
community asset, which the wife had not listed in her bankruptcy action, was liquidated and the
profits split between the former spouses, the wife immediately began to spend her share instead of
paying the debts that had been assigned to her in the divorce decree. Id. at 741, 184 Cal. Rptr. at
758. The husband obtained a temporary restraining order from the state court to prevent her from
spending the remaining funds, pending a hearing to determine whether her money from the liquida-
tion of community property must be used to satisfy her discharged debts. Id. When the bankruptcy
court in an ex parte order dissolved the restraining order, the wife spent $5237 of her remaining
$6000 in less than two weeks. Id. at 742, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 758. The state court then automatically
reinstated a previous order, which allowed the husband to offset spousal support payments to the
extent that he became liable for the debt. Id. The wife appealed first to the bankruptcy court, which
held that it was without jurisdiction to invalidate a state court modification action. Id. at 742 n.3,
184 Cal. Rptr. at 758 n.3. At the formal hearing on the wife's objection to the state court action, the
bankruptcy court for the first time was apprised of the true nature and purpose of the debt, and
stated that modification actions are the "exclusive province of the state family law court." Id.
294. Id. at 743-44, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
295. Id. at 742, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
296. Id. at 746, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 761. The court further implied that if the divorce court had
originally specifically ordered that the debts be paid from the sale of community property, the entire
problem might have been avoided. Id. at 744-45, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
297. Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 781 (Wyo. 1986). Although the court in Macy remanded
without suggestion "that child support must be reduced or increased," it noted the extent of the
debts for which the husband had become liable and questioned whether his financial ability was such
that he could meet the increased child support decreed by the trial court. Id. A dissenting opinion
criticized the court's decision to remand for hearing on the husband's oral motion for reduction of
child support as permitting an offset to be accomplished indirectly when it was forbidden to be done
directly. Id. at 782-83 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 777, 780. The court observed, however, that, unlike withholding alimony, withhold-
ing child support deprives the children. Id. at 777.
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discharged from obligations owed to third parties and the nonbankrupt spouse
has become directly liable to those creditors, he will not be able to offset or
modify his direct obligation to the bankrupt. Williams v. Williams, 299 a Califor-
nia case, is illustrative. In Williams, the husband had unilaterally ceased making
property settlement payments when the wife failed to comply with her obliga-
tions under the parties' divorce decree.30" The wife was then discharged in
bankruptcy of her share of the community debts and her obligations to the hus-
band. 30 1 The state court granted him an offset of the arrearages for which he
was held liable by the creditors, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that
no relief was available when no support order existed to be modified. 30 2
Although the state has statutory provisions giving the court inherent power
to enforce judgments, the Williams court interpreted those provisions to be lim-
ited by federal bankruptcy law's power to discharge property settlement
debts.30 3 The court declared, "[d]espite the obvious inequities of permitting one
spouse who has assumed a share of the community property debts.., to subse-
quently discharge those debts and leave the nonbankrupt spouse liable, in appar-
ent derogation of the otherwise equal division of community property, the
practice is well recognized and not one easily circumvented by the trial
courts."'30 4 The debtor's recourse lies in the bankruptcy action, not later in the
state court, despite the wife's failure to reveal certain assets and liabilities. 305
More surprisingly, the Williams court also found that the state's statutory
authorization to grant support for a spouse when the other spouse is discharged
of a property settlement obligation was inapplicable. 30 6 Section 4812 of the Cal-
ifornia Civil Code provides:
In the event obligations for property settlement to a spouse or support
of a spouse are discharged in bankruptcy, the court may make all
proper orders for the support of such spouse, as the court may deem
just, having regard for the circumstances of the respective parties and
the amount of any obligation under a property settlement agreement
299. 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 203 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1984).
300. Id. at 1218, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 910. The husband was to pay the wife $81.49 per month (a
share of his retirement pay) for their joint lives. Id. To equalize their property division, the wife was
ordered to deliver a promissory note, to be secured by a deed of trust on real property awarded her,
and to deliver to him certain items of his separate personal property. Id. at 1218, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
910-11. After the wife failed to comply and the husband ceased making payments to her, the wife
received a writ of execution and levied on the husband's savings account to recover the arrearages.
Id. at 1218, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 910. When the husband moved to vacate the levy and sought to have
the wife held in contempt for her failure to comply with the decree, the wife filed for bankruptcy. Id.
at 1218, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11.
301. Id. at 1219-20, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 912. The husband did not appear in the bankruptcy action
to object or attempt to obtain an offset, although he turned over all the papers relating to that action
to his attorney. Id. at 1220, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
302. Id. at 1227, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 917. The trial court deferred on the contempt issue, finding
that the wife had committed fraud in both the divorce and bankruptcy actions. Id. at 1218, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 911.
303. Id. at 1220, 203 Cal. Rptr. 912 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4380; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 128).
304. Id. at 1221, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
305. Id. at 1223-24, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15.
306. Id. at 1225-26, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 916. 9
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which are discharged. 30 7
Despite the legislature's intention to address this precise problem,308 the Wil-
liams court interpreted the statute to be limited to modifying existing support
orders, not final property settlements, notwithstanding the inequities that occur
in cases of this nature. Because the periodic payment that the husband owed the
wife was not support, no modification could be authorized.
The state courts have recognized the correlation between support and prop-
erty division to a greater extent than the bankruptcy courts and have appreci-
ated the unfairness that discharge in bankruptcy can impart on the nonbankrupt
former spouse. The state courts frequently have demonstrated a willingness-
even an eagerness-to remedy the inequity caused by one former spouse's dis-
charge of marital debts, but have been constrained by state law. Those courts,
however, possess greater power to prevent such inequity when the dis-
chargeability determination is conducted in a state forum.
C. Dischargeability Determinations in the State Courts
Although dischargeability determinations under section 523(a)(5) are usu-
ally made in the bankruptcy courts, the jurisdiction of those courts is not exclu-
sive.30 9 While section 523(c) requires creditors of specified debts to request a
hearing in the bankruptcy action to determine dischargeability, 3 10 debts under
section 523(a)(5) are not included in that provision. Thus, the dischargeability
determination for debts falling within section 523(a)(5) may be made by other
courts, unless either the debtor or the creditor files a complaint in the bank-
ruptcy court.311 While the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts is gener-
307. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4812 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
308. Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1226, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 916. The court quoted the legislative
report: "This provision is as close to reinstating debts owed to spouses as federal law will permit.
Public policy should encourage payment of debts and support obligations ...." Id. at 1222, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 916-17 (quoting THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST OF ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1269
(1976-1978 Reg. Sess.)).
309. 3 L. KING, supra note 96, at § 523.15(6); see also State ex rel. Rough v. District Court of
Eighth Judicial Dist., 710 P.2d 47 (Mont. 1985) (district court had jurisdiction to enforce obligation
allegedly discharged by bankruptcy suit); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 238, 784 P.2d 420,
425 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) ("the bankruptcy court and the state district court have concurrent juris-
diction to determine whether a debt arising out of a divorce agreement is dischargeable under Sec-
tion 523(a)(5)"). Before the 1970 amendments to the previous Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-467,
84 Stat. 990 (1970), most dischargeability determinations were conducted by state courts. See
Swann, supra note 8, at 234; see also Schwartzberg, supra note 223, at 6 (noting that until 1970, cases
"concerning a creditor's objection to the dischargeability of a specific claim ... were decided in
nonbankruptcy courts by state and federal judges who did not specialize in bankruptcy problems").
310. Section 523(c) of title 11 provides:
Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) [pertaining to certain unlisted or unscheduled
creditors without notice or actual knowledge of the case] of this section, the debtor shall be
discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2) [certain types of fraud], (4)
[fraud or defalcation while acting as a fiduciary, embezzlement, or larceny], or (6) [willful
and malicious injury] of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to
whom such debt is owned [sic], and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such
debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of
subsection (a) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988).
311. 3 L. KING, supra note 96, at § 523.15. The Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule
4007(b) states that jurisdiction over dischargeability determinations under § 523(a)(5), inter alia, "is
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ally acknowledged,3 12 those courts have been presented with the opportunity to
exercise that jurisdiction on relatively rare occasions.313 When a state court
addresses the dischargeability issue, it must apply federal bankruptcy law.3 14
Once the state court has made its dischargeability determination, the issue may
not be relitigated in the federal courts.3 15
Typically, because determinations of debts excepted under section 523(a)(5)
need not be timely made in the bankruptcy action,3 16 the dischargeability issue
reaches the state court after completion of a debtor's bankruptcy action in which
the bankruptcy court never addressed the nature of a marital debt. Subse-
quently, when a former spouse attempts to enforce the obligation in state court,
the debtor defends by asserting his general discharge.3 17 To ascertain whether
the debt survived the bankruptcy action, the state court will need to analyze the
nature of that debt, employing the federal bankruptcy criteria.
The 1987 Minnesota case of Long v. Long318 is illustrative. In Long the
parties had acknowledged in a stipulated divorce judgment "that a portion of
held concurrently by the bankruptcy court and any appropriate nonbankruptcy forum." R. BANKR.
P. 4007(b) (1990).
312. See Aldrich v. Imbrogno (In re Aldrich), 34 Bankr. 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1983); Erspan v.
Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 1981); Jordan v. Jordan (In re Jordan), 47 Bankr. 853, 855 n.4
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Davich v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Davich (In re Davich), 27 Bankr. 888,
890 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); In re Marriage of Salisbury, 13 Kan. App. 2d 740, 742, 779 P.2d 878, 880
(1989); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 238, 784 P.2d 420, 425 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); Hopkins
v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500, 503 (R.I. 1985) (citing 3 L. KING, supra note 96, at § 523.15). But cf
Romeo v. Romeo (In re Romeo), 16 Bankr. 531, 534 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel not applicable where state court merely concluded debts were nondischargeable and
basis for conclusion indiscernible).
313. See Roberts v. Roberts, 261 Cal. App. 2d 424, 428, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (1968); Foster v.
Childers, 416 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Long v. Long, 413 N.W. 863, 866-67 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); State ex rel. Rough v. District Court, 710 P.2d 47, 49 (Mont. 1985); Loyko v.
Loyko, 200 N.J. Super. 152, 156, 490 A.2d 802, 804 (1985); Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 238, 784 P.2d at
425; Thompson v. Thompson, 501 N.E.2d 108, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Buccino v. Buccino, -
Pa. Super. _, 580 A.2d 13, 14 (1990).
314. See Sailsbury, 13 Kan. App. 2d at 743, 779 P.2d at 881; Rough, 710 P.2d at 49; Loyko, 200
N.J. Super. at 156, 490 A.2d at 804; Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 238, 784 P.2d at 425.
315. See Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604 (10th Cir. 1983) (when identical dischargeability issue
actually litigated in state court, collateral estoppel bars relitigation in federal court); Polley v. Span-
gler (In re Polley), 74 Bankr. 68, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (state court determination that debt is
nondischargeable has collateral estoppel effect on bankruptcy court); Grimshaw v. Grimshaw (In re
Grimshaw), 57 Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (same); Kuzminski v. Peterman (In re
Peterman), 5 Bankr. 687, 691-92 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (relitigation of state court's determination
that debt is dischargeable precluded by res judicata and collateral estoppel).
316. Bankruptcy Rule 4007(b) provides: "A complaint other than under § 523(c) may be filed at
any time. A case may be reopened without payment of an additional filing fee for the purpose of
filing a complaint to obtain a determination under this rule." The Advisory Committee Note states
that subdivision (b) "does not contain a time limit for filing a complaint to dischargeability of a type
of debt listed as nondischargeable under § 523(a)... (5)." R. BANKR. P. 4007(b) advisory commit-
tee note; see also 3 L. KING, supra note 96, at § 523.15(6).
317. Failure to give sufficient notice to the creditor will cause a debt to be considered nondis-
chargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). Although § 523(a)(3)(A) permits discharge of debts not specified
in §§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) when the creditor "had notice or actual knowledge of the case", 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added), even if the debt was not listed or scheduled, the courts have
interpreted the protection afforded support debts under § 523(a)(5) to override the notice provision.
See Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Rediker, 25 Bankr. 71, 75 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1982); Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 5 Bankr. 434, 443 (Bankr, D. Utah 1980);
Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 239, 784 P.2d at 426.
318. 413 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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[their property settlement] is being used for the care and support of the minor
children," and set out conditions for the reduction of the husband's twenty years
of monthly payments to the wife.3 19 Three months after the divorce, the hus-
band fied bankruptcy and listed the wife as an unsecured creditor.320 Although
she had actual notice of the proceeding, the wife did not contest, and the prop-
erty settlement debt was discharged. 32 1 Five years later, the wife sought a
money judgment in state court for accrued child support under the original
property settlement and petitioned for an increase in future child support; the
trial court entered a judgment for $16,800 in rearages, but ordered no
increase. 322
On appeal the husband argued that because the wife had notice of the bank-
ruptcy action, her failure to raise the dischargeability question in that court con-
stituted a waiver and the bankruptcy discharge should be considered final. 3 2 3
Nevertheless, the court of appeals found that because the debtor had not segre-
gated the portion of the debt attributable to child support from the rest of the
debt owed his former spouse, the bankruptcy court never addressed that issue
and res judicata did not bar the wife's state court action. 32 4 The court of appeals
interpreted the language of the bankruptcy code as an absolute statement that a
debtor is not discharged of his debts owed to a spouse for child support, holding
that the rendition of a discharge does not prevent the state court from "looking
into the proceedings" in determining the underlying nature of the liability.325
The court noted:
The approved practice at present ... is to enter a general order of
discharge and permit the bankrupt to plead his discharge as a defense
in the state or other court where the creditor seeks to enforce his claim.
The court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the claim and of
the parties is competent to determine whether the debt is affected by
the discharge in bankruptcy or whether the claim is excluded under
any of the provisions of [bankruptcy law]. 32 6
The Long court concluded that the trial court had correctly determined the por-
tion of the debt that represented nondischargeable child support.327
Similarly, in State ex rel Rough v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dis-
319. Id. at 865. Pursuant to their agreement, the husband was to pay the wife $172,300 "for
settlement of property rights" at $1896.60 per month for twenty years. They further agreed that the
principal would be reduced by $27,300 if both children died before reaching age 18 or if custody
were changed, the reduction decreasing by $3,600 per year after the date of the decree. Id.
320. The husband listed the debts as "Further Property Settlement for Divorce, Sept. 1981." Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. The wife requested, among other things, a money judgment of $300 per month, repre-
senting child support that had accrued since the husband had ceased payments under the property
settlement. Id. at 866.
323. Id. at 867.
324. Id.
325. Id. (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 72 (1904)).
326. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 1946), overruled by
Craycraft v. Adams, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 318 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 1982)).
327. The judgment ordered payment of $27,300, the amount of the property settlement that was
to have been eliminated if the children no longer lived with their mother. Id. at 867-68.
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trict, 328 the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that the state court had the
authority to determine the nature of a husband's marital agreement to pay a
debt owed to a credit union. 329 The husband had listed the credit union, but not
his former wife, as a creditor in his bankruptcy petition. 330 After his general
discharge, the credit union brought a collection suit against the wife, who then
requested the state court to enforce the provision of the divorce decree.331 The
trial court held the husband in contempt for his failure to comply with the de-
cree,332 and the husband sought certiorari, arguing that the debt had been dis-
charged. The supreme court, noting that "some debts flow through the
bankruptcy unaffected even though the debtor is granted a general dis-
charge, '333 concluded that the state court had the power to determine the na-
ture of the debt.334 It held that the substance of the debt, not its label, controls
its characterization for bankruptcy purposes and remanded the case for determi-
nation of the nature of the obligation consistent with bankruptcy law
standards.335
The state courts consistently have proven that they are capable of applying
federal law to ascertain the nature of a marital debt.336 For example, one court
noted that it is appropriate to "look behind the original judgment to ascertain
the true nature of the claim or obligation imposed under a divorce decree," and
determined that attorney fees awarded to a wife in an earlier divorce action had
328. 710 P.2d 47 (Mont. 1985).
329. Id. at 48-49. Five months prior to their divorce, the spouses co-signed a promissory note
for $2,394.20 to the credit union. The wife also signed a separate guarantee agreement. Id. at 48.
330. Id.
331. The wife sought to enforce the terms of the divorce decree and to require the husband to
make arrangements that would release her from her obligation to the credit union. Id.
332. Id. The trial court held that although the bankruptcy discharged the husband's direct obli-
gation to the credit union, it did not discharge his obligation to the wife under the decree. Id. It
held him in contempt for failing to pay the credit union debt, but stayed the judgment contingent on
his making arrangements to pay the debt and the wife's attorney's fees. Id. Upon his failure to
comply, the court ordered the husband to serve five days in jail and to execute an allotment to the
wife to satisfy his obligation to her. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 49.
335. Id. The court adopted the Ninth Circuit position that "the court must look beyond the
language of the decree to the intent of the parties and to the substance of the obligation." Id at 50
(quoting Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984)).
336. The same result was achieved under the previous Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)
(1976). See Roberts v. Roberts, 261 Cal. App. 2d 424, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1968). In Roberts the
California Court of Appeals decided that the husband's discharge in a bankruptcy action, in which
he named his former wife as a creditor, was not res judicata with respect to the dischargeability of
periodic payments due under a divorce decree. Id. at 426-27, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62. The decree had
incorporated the parties' property settlement, in which the husband had agreed, in clear, unambigu-
ous terms, to make a series of periodic payments to the wife "for her support and maintenance...
continuing until wife dies or remarries." Id. at 429, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 62. Although in an earlier state
court action the trial court had determined that the debt was based on a property division and, as
such, was not modifiable, the supreme court distinguished "pure" property settlements from those
settlements that function as support. Id. at 427, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 61. It concluded that the debt in
question was an "integrated" one, in which property division serves as support, and was not dis-
chargeable under bankruptcy law. Id. at 427-28, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62. Roberts clearly illustrates
that the state courts are competent to apply different definitions of support and property division to
distinguish between modification issues and federal dischargeability questions.
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not been discharged in the husband's later bankruptcy.3 3 7 That same court held
that an award to the wife of the husband's pension benefits and a hold-harmless
provision with respect to a bank loan were clearly part of a property division;
thus, their discharge in bankruptcy could not be circumvented by denominating
both provisions as awards of maintenance.3 3 8 Another court held that the
"clear economic realities" facing the parties at the time of their divorce led it to
conclude that the husband's assumption of a debt had the effect of providing
necessary support to the wife and children, despite the wife's waiver of alimony
in the divorce action; therefore, the husband's bankruptcy had not discharged
the debt.339
Although the state courts have demonstrated their competency in applying
federal law to make dischargeability determinations, a remaining issue confronts
those courts: What test should a state court apply in making such determina-
tions? Specifically, should a state court modify a support award by employing a
present circumstances test?
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico recently confronted that precise
question. In Hopkins v. Hopkins34° the court faced the characterization of the
nature of a husband's obligation to make mortgage payments on the residence
awarded to the wife in an earlier divorce decree after the husband had been
granted a general discharge in a bankruptcy action that had not confronted the
issue.341 After analysis of the federal courts' application of the "intent test," the
337. Foster v. Childers, 416 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Jones v. Jones, 300
Minn. 182, 186, 220 N.W.2d 287, 290 (1974)).
338. Id. at 785. The court failed to analyze the actual effect or function of these debts. It did,
however, remand the case for consideration of a modification of maintenance based on the negative
effect of the husband's bankruptcy on the wife's financial condition. Id. at 786.
339. Loyko v. Loyko, 200 NJ. Super. 152, 157, 490 A.2d 802, 804-05 (1985). During the pen-
dency of the husband's bankruptcy action, the former wife filed an enforcement motion in the state
court seeking a declaration that mortgage payment arrears and the husband's obligation to continue
paying the mortgage were not dischargeable. Id. at 155, 490 A.2d at 803. Although the Loyko court
relied on Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983), it did not consider the
relevance of present circumstances of the parties in its decision.
340. 109 N.M. 233, 784 P.2d 420 (1989).
341. In Hopkins the parties had obtained a stipulated divorce decree in 1934, under which the
husband was to pay child support. Id. at 235, 784 P.2d at 422. The wife was awarded the family
residence and assumed responsibility for the first mortgage. The husband agreed to assume other
community debts, including two which were secured by second and third mortgages on the home.
The following year, he filed for bankruptcy in another state, listing the third party creditors, but not
his former wife, who had actual knowledge but no formal notification and no knowledge of the
bankruptcy stay. After the husband's discharge, the creditors foreclosed on the family residence in
1986 and obtained a deficiency judgment against the wife. Neighbors purchased the home and ver-
bally agreed to convey the second mortgage to her for their purchase price, allowing her to remain in
the home. In 1987 the former wife filed a state court motion for contempt against the husband for
child support arrearages and for his failure to pay the sums owed to the foreclosing creditors. He, in
turn, sought a change of custody and reduction of child support. The trial court denied his motions
and awarded the wife child support arrearages. Id. at 235-36, 784 P.2d at 422-23. More controver-
sially, the court characterized his obligations on the mortgages as in the nature of child support, and
ordered him to execute a note secured by a mortgage on his real property. Id. The husband moved
for a reopening of the bankruptcy action, seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the state
court order. Id. at 236, 784 P.2d at 423. The bankruptcy court reopened, and his state court appeal
was stayed. The bankruptcy court then refused the injunction, finding that although the wife had
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy action, she received no formal written notice of either the filing
or the injunction against creditor action. Id. It concluded that it would be inappropriate to forbid
her from bringing a state court action "or otherwise to interfere with state court jurisdiction in
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court concluded that the trial court implicitly had found the requisite intent to
create a support obligation because of the function of the debt, despite a provi-
sion in the divorce decree that no alimony would be awarded. 342
The Hopkins court, however, further adopted the additional elements of
Calhoun's intent test, requiring inquiry into the reasonableness of the debt, both
at the time of creation and at the time of bankruptcy.343 Acknowledging that
other federal circuits have rejected a reasonableness analysis, 344 the court
pointed out that those courts have done so on the rationale that such an inquiry
is more appropriate for the state courts; thus, application of a present circum-
stances test is entirely proper when a state court determines dischargeability. 345
Consequently, after application of a reasonableness test, a debt should be "modi-
fied" to the extent that it exceeds a debtor's ability to pay.34 6 Because no rea-
sonableness inquiry had been made, the court of appeals remanded the case to
the trial court.
Significantly, the Hopkins court further noted that "in exceptional circum-
stances," the original decree could be modified to include a support obligation
when justified.347 Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), recognized as "a reservoir of
equitable power in order to accomplish justice, '3 48 allows unspecified relief in
appropriate circumstances, which the Hopkins court believed were present in
this case because the husband's failure to make the mortgage payments had re-
sulted in foreclosure upon the family home. Thus, Hopkins suggests that the
state courts have a vehicle for upward modification of support as well as down-
ward adjustment, in appropriate circumstances when bankruptcy renders the
original decree unjust. 34 9
domestic relations matters." Id. The husband appealed to the state court, arguing that the debt was
not in the nature of support and had been discharged. Id. at 234-35, 784 P.2d at 421-22.
342. Id. at 239-40, 784 P.2d at 426-27. The trial court found that the obligation was undertaken
in lieu of alimony and to provide a home for the children, which the court of appeals viewed as
"essential to its conclusion" that the obligation was for support. Id. at 239, 784 P.2d at 426. Rele-
vant factors for determining intent include the language of the document, the placement of the
provisions in the decree, and the family's need. Id.; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 27 Ohio App.
3d 296, 501 N.E.2d 108 (1986) (dischargeability determined by state court referee by application of
Calhoun test; appellant's failure to file transcript prevents review of referee's factual conclusions).
343. Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 240, 784 P.2d at 427.
344. Id. (citing Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1989); Harrell v. Sharp (In re
Harrell), 754 F.2d 902 (1lth Cir. 1985)).
345. Furthermore, the court found that application of this test is consistent with the congres-
sional intent that "courts determine the essence of a debt which 'is' in the nature of support." Id.
346. In applying a reasonableness test, the trial court must determine whether the obligation
exceeded the debtor's ability to pay; if it was "'manifestly unreasonable under traditional concepts
of support'" at either its inception or at bankruptcy, a reasonable limit must be imposed. Id. (quot-
ing Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 (6th Cir. 1983)). The parties' implicit
intention to create an obligation that functioned as support authorized the trial court to classify that
debt as a nondischargeable support obligation, but only to the extent that the debt was not "mani-
festly unreasonable" at both relevant times. Id. The court should perform a complete evaluation of
each party's total financial status, including their earning capacity, work history, and capability. Id.
at 240-41, 784 P.2d at 427-28.
347. Id. at 241, 784 P.2d at 428.
348. Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver, 101 N.M. 105, 108, 678 P.2d 1180, 1183 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984), quoted in Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 241, 784 P.2d at 428.
349. The Hopkins court distinguished the earlier Benavides case, see supra note 275, by noting
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Although the state courts can, and have, effectively applied federal law to
determine dischargeability, their opportunity to do so has been limited primarily
to cases in which the support obligation has been overlooked in the bankruptcy
action. When the bankrupt's former spouse has had proper notice and the op-
portunity to litigate the nature of the debt in the bankruptcy action,350 res judi-
cata will prevent reevaluation of the debt in state court. Where the nature of the
debt has not been addressed squarely in the bankruptcy action, the dis-
chargeability determination may take place many years later.35 1 The result is
that both spouses may live in uncertainty and the support recipients may be
irreparably harmed. 352 Conversely, the nonbankrupt spouse may be allowed to
ignore the bankruptcy proceeding and bring a state court action at a much later
time, possibly after the debtor has detrimentally relied on his discharge. Failure
to settle the dischargeability issue at the time of bankruptcy can result in contin-
uing legal and practical problems; thus, although the state court may be a prefer-
able forum for determining the nature of a marital debt, the issue should be
conclusively resolved at the time of bankruptcy to avoid potential injury and
protracted litigation.3 53 The following discussion suggests an innovative option.
V. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH
Although bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to determine dis-
chargeability, 354 they also have statutory power to abstain from deciding certain
issues in appropriate cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (c)(1) provides for permissive ab-
stention: "Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of jus-
tice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11.''3 55 If
that the trial court in the instant case had found that the obligation to pay the mortgage constituted
a support obligation existing in the original decree. Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 241, 784 P.2d at 428.
350. See supra note 275.
351. See Long v. Long, 413 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (wife brought state court action
five years after husband's bankruptcy).
352. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 109 N.M. 233, 784 P.2d 420 (N.M. CL App. 1989) (family resi-
dence sold at foreclosure).
353. But see Note, supra note 102, at 587 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should be authorized
to modify alimony in Chapter 13 cases).
354. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988); see supra note 223.
355. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code extends this power to the bankruptcy
courts:
The court... may dismiss a case under this title or may suspend all proceedings in a case
under this title, at any time if-
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal
or suspension; or
(2)(A) there is pending a foreign proceeding; and (B) the factors specified in Section
304(c) of this title warrant such dismissal or suspension.
11 U.S.C. § 305. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) provides for mandatory abstention:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law
cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a
case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a
court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall
abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudi-
cated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under
this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
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there is an ongoing proceeding in a state court, the bankruptcy court may ab-
stain, at least until that proceeding is concluded. 35 6 However, a pending state
court action is not a prerequisite for abstention.3 57 In determining whether ab-
stention is appropriate, the court should consider a number of factors, including
the effect on the bankruptcy action, the extent of state law issues, the difficulty
or uncertainty of state law principles, related proceedings in state courts, and the
feasibility of severing state law claims.358 Because of state interest in family law
matters, the bankruptcy courts frequently have abstained with respect to issues
involving domestic relations, 359 although the federal courts need not abstain in
every case solely because a domestic relations question is involved. 360 One court
has noted: "In no other field does abstention better serve the interests of the
parties and other interested persons than in that of domestic relations law."'361
Abstention is particularly appropriate when the state court is more familiar than
the bankruptcy court with the facts and circumstances of a case and, thus, is in a
better position to determine dischargeability. 362 The bankruptcy courts should
"avoid invasions into family law matters 'out of consideration of court economy,
judicial restraint, and deference to our state court brethren and their established
expertise in such matters.' "363
On relatively rare occasions, bankruptcy courts have deferred to state
The reference in Section 1334(c) to a "particular proceeding" in subsection (1) and a "proceeding"
in subsection (2) probably limits its effect to issues encompassing less than the full scope of the
bankruptcy case. D. CowAN, CowAN's BANKRUPTcy LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.4, 46 (1987 ed.).
356. See Ramus v. Ramus (In re Ramus), 32 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); Kaplan v.
Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 18 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
357. World Solar Corp. v. Steinbaum (In re World Solar Corp.), 81 Bankr. 603, 612 (Dankr.
S.D. Cal. 1988) (mandatory abstention appropriate if action can be timely filed in state court with
proper jurisdiction).
358. Republic Reader's Serv., Inc. v. Magazine Serv. Bureau, Inc. (In re Republic Reader's
Serv., Inc.), 81 Bankr. 422, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) (additional factors include jurisdictional
basis, degree of relationship to the main bankruptcy case, substance of alleged "core" proceeding,
burden on the bankruptcy court docket, likelihood of forum shopping, right to a jury trial, and
presence of nondebtor parties); see also Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc. (In re Arctic Enter-
prises, Inc.), 68 Bankr. 71, 78 (D. Minn. 1986) (abstention appropriate when state court better suited
or more convenient or where federal court claim not made in good faith).
359. See Kohn v. Hursa (In re Hursa), 87 Bankr. 313, 323 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (abstention to
allow state court to conclude equitable division of property in ongoing divorce proceeding); Baum-
gartner v. Baumgartner (In re Baumgartner), 57 Bankr. 517, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (absten-
tion to allow state court to evaluate former wife's status as creditor of debts based on prenuptial
agreement); Kaplan v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 18 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (ab-
stention in hearing dischargeability because divorce proceeding pending in state court and no award
of alimony yet made); Chrystler v. Heslar (In re Heslar), 16 Bankr. 329 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)(determination of rights to equity in real estate during pending divorce); In re Evans, 8 Bankr. 568,
572 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (wife put husband into involuntary bankruptcy out of animosity over
prior divorce); see also In re Ericson, 26 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (court abstained from
determining rights of unmarried cohabitants).
360. Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 553 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (court refused to abstain when
wife brought federal court action to enforce award of military retirement benefits awarded in divorce
decree after husband's bankruptcy action and his later initiation of contempt proceeding for viola-
tion of injunction based on discharge), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
361. Heslar, 16 Bankr. at 333.
362. In re Reak, 92 Bankr. 804, 807 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
363. White v. White (In re White), 851 F.2d 170, 173 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re MacDonald,
755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Graham, 14 Bankr. 246, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Ky
1981))).
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courts for determination of the dischargeability of marital debts during the
course of bankruptcy actions. In Mathes v. Mathes (In re Mathes),364 the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed
without prejudice the dischargeability issue to allow the parties to litigate the
matter in state court. In Mathes, the former spouses had agreed after their di-
vorce that the husband would make monthly payments on a residence occupied
by the wife and children. 365 Although the agreement, which the parties never
submitted to a court for approval, expressly stated that its provisions did not
constitute alimony, the bankruptcy court found that uncontroverted evidence
demonstrated that the purpose or function of the debt "was to put 'a roof over
the heads' of the plaintiff and her children." 3 66 The Mathes court held that the
state dissolution tribunal first should address the nature of the debt:
It is fundamental that the bankruptcy court, in making the dis-
chargeability determination, cannot modify the basic award made by
the state dissolution court. It is not within the lawful powers of a bank-
ruptcy court to redetermine the basic need of the plaintiff according to
changed circumstances and thereby substitute its own award for the
[sic] of the state dissolution court. Simply to supplement the state
court award before the state court had an opportunity to determine
whether it should be made at all would violate this cardinal
principle.367
The Mathes court considered it the state court's duty to define the parties' rela-
tionship, a determination that must occur prior to any finding of dis-
chargeability. Once the state court has resolved the relationship, the state court
may determine dischargeability by applying federal law, or the action may be
reinstated in the bankruptcy court.368
The same court again refused to hear a dischargeabiity claim in Hague v.
Hague (In re Hague),369 holding that state court resolution would be more ap-
propriate.370 Because the payments did not provide alimony, support, or main-
tenance unambiguously, the bankruptcy court's first obligation would be to
determine the type of debt the parties intended to create. 37 1 The court noted
that no restrictions prohibited the state courts from adjudicating both the under-
lying liability question and the dischargeability issue, reasoning that, under the
364. 58 Bankr. 4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
365. The agreement provided that ifa certain loan were granted the husband, he would pay the
wife a specific sum. It further specified that the terms of the agreement "are contractual and not to
be construed as maintenance and are not subject to modification under the dissolution of marriage
law, and can only be modified or amended by written agreement of the parties hereto." Id. at 5 n.2.
366. Id. at 5-6.
367. Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
368. Id.
369. 57 Bankr. 511 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
370. The court previously had granted the wife relief from the automatic stay in order to initiate
state court dischargeability proceedings, partly because plaintiff did not allege that prepetition debt
had accumulated at that time. The wife later moved for "partial reconsideration" of the judgment
on the basis that past due maintenance payments in fact had accrued prior to the husband's bank-
ruptcy petition. Id. at 512.
371. Id. (citing Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983)).
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circumstances, litigation in state court would be more convenient. 372
The recent case of Buccino v. Buccino373 illustrates this approach at the
state court level. In Buccino the husband filed for bankruptcy six months after
the couple's divorce; he listed the wife as creditor and sought discharge of all the
marital debts ordered in the divorce decree.374 The wife entered a motion for
relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court, requesting that the state
divorce court determine the dischargeability issue. Recognizing that the state
court's dischargeability decision would bind it, the bankruptcy court granted the
wife's motion and abstained from determining the nature of the marital debts. 375
The state trial court found that all the debts were necessary for the support and
maintenance of the wife and the couple's child and were not subject to dis-
charge;376 the husband appealed.
After a meticulous and exhaustive review of both bankruptcy law and state
family law, the appellate court affirmed in an opinion that should serve as a
model of analysis for bankruptcy and state courts alike.377 The Buccino court
focused on the policies underlying the support exception and concluded that
former spouses and children should be "liberally protected" against discharge378
because Congress intended their rights to have priority over the debtor's interest
in a "fresh start."'379
The Buccino court noted that the difficulty in performing dischargeability
determinations results from two problems. First, a strict intent test is frequently
impossible to perform because the parties often have not contemplated resulting
legal consequences. 380
Second, and even more importantly, the evolution of domestic rela-
tions law has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between ali-
mony (or support) and property distribution. Frequently, courts will
resolve all economic issues arising from a divorce simultaneously and
372. Id.
373. - Pa. Super. _ 580 A.2d 13 (1990).
374. After their marriage in 1979, the wife supported the couple, contributing over $70,000 to
the husband's education and career advancement, while the husband attended dental school and
supplemented the family income during his early years of practice. The wife's parents made gener-
ous gifts and loans to the couple. During their separation, the wife moved to her parent's home in
Massachusetts with the couple's child, and the husband moved to Indiana to obtain a graduate
degree, taking the couple's mobile home with him. At the conclusion of their bitter divorce in 1986,
the trial court, believing it could not directly reimburse the wife for her contributions, formulated an
award to allow alimony beginning when the husband completed his residency. In recognition of his
earning potential, the court further ordered the husband to pay the wife $3750, one-half the value of
gifts from her parents; $9400, one-half the equity in the mobile home; and one-half the value of his
IRA and retirement plan. The court's order did not segregate the provisions relating to custody,
child support, alimony, or property division; rather, in narrative form, it "as a whole addressed each
party's rights and obligations resulting from the dissolution of the marriage." Id. at -, 580 A.2d at
15.
375. Id. at -, 580 A.2d at 16.
376. Id.
377. Upon observing that federal bankruptcy law must be applied, the court remarked: "This
principle is far easier to state than it is to apply." Id. at -, 580 A.2d at 17.
378. Id. at _, 580 A.2d at 18 (citing Schmiel v. Judge (In re Schmiel), 94 Bankr. 373, 377
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)).
379. Id.
380. Id. (citing Rankin v. Alloway (In re Alloway), 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)).
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invariably will adjust alimony awards depending on the nature and
amount of marital assets available for distribution.3 8 1
Although the Buccino court was unable to discern a "clear and consistent"
federal test for dischargeability, it isolated common factors, focusing on the in-
tentions of the parties and the court, and the effect and function of the obligation
imposed.38 2 The court further observed that not only will the appropriate fac-
tors vary from case to case, but the weight of their importance will differ.3 83
Applying that analysis to the debts at issue, the court concluded that, despite the
form and amounts of the awards, the divorce court had intended to provide
support.3 84 The court further noted that the duty of support may exceed mini-
mal necessity.3 85 Finally, the court rejected application of a present circum-
stances test in dischargeability determinations,3 86 but added that state court
relief occasionally may be appropriate in situations "wherein a nondischargeable
support obligation far exceeds either the reasonable needs of the recipient or the
ability of the debtor to pay."38 7
The Buccino court delved more deeply into the underlying nature of the
debts than most bankruptcy courts, considering both the economic and
noneconomic factors that had motivated the divorce court in constructing the
award.38 8 The court demonstrated sensitivity to the correlation between sup-
port and property division and managed to preserve innovative support debts,
which had many of the earmarks of property division frequently relied upon by
the bankruptcy courts. Buccino is a prime example of the state courts' superior
qualifications over the bankruptcy courts for determining support related issues.
The state courts have demonstrated their willingness and ability to deter-
mine dischargeability, employing federal standards. A preferable procedure
would be for the bankruptcy courts to defer to the state courts whenever uncer-
tainty about the nature of a marital debt arises.
VI. CONCLUSION
The artificial distinction drawn between nondischargeable alimony, mainte-
nance, and support debts on the one hand, and dischargeable property division
debts on the other, continues to plague bankruptcy litigation whenever a debtor
381. Id. at -, 580 A.2d at 18 (footnote omitted).
382. The court emphasized that labels should not control the characterization; rather, the court
should focus on whether equitable distribution of property reasonably meets the needs of the recipi-
ent. "[lncome, employability, marital standard of living, needs and economic circumstances" all
enter into a state court property division, and the award "may have a 'support' component." Id.
383. Id. at -' 580 A.2d at 20.
384. Id.
385. Id. at , 580 A.2d at 23-24.
386. Id. at , 580 A.2d at 24. It is important to note that, in rejecting a present circumstances
test, the Buccino court was responding to the debtor husband's objection to the trial court's inquiry
into his current financial status. Although the Buccino court rejected that test, it held that the
determination was not altered by the inquiry.
387. Id.
388. Id. at -, 580 A.2d at 18 n.15 (observing that the Pennsylvania Divorce Code directs di-
vorce courts to consider "overlapping economic and non-economic factors both in awarding alimony
and in distributing marital assets").
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has incurred debts pursuant to a divorce. Although federal bankruptcy law has
made progress in developing an analytical framework for discerning the underly-
ing nature of a marital debt, the result in a given case remains unpredictable.
State courts have struggled to compensate support recipients for financial
losses incurred when marital debts are discharged in their former spouses' bank-
ruptcy actions, but the courts' own modification laws have constrained them.38 9
When state courts have been able to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction to
determine dischargeability issues, their task has proved simpler. The cases con-
firm that not only are state courts capable of applying federal dischargeability
law, they are, in fact, a preferable forum for such determinations. State courts
have a greater interest in assuring former spouses and children adequate protec-
tion from loss of support. They possess more experience and expertise in evalu-
ating the competing interests of the parties. They are more familiar with local
economic conditions relative to the parties' needs and frequently employ spe-
cially trained personnel.390 Furthermore, state courts are in a better position to
analyze the strength of their own policy interests in awarding particular forms of
support and to evaluate the prudence of modifying an award. 391 While the
bankruptcy courts focus primarily on financial considerations, the state courts
are accustomed to weighing both monetary and noneconomic factors in marital
disputes.
Most significantly, state courts have the power to increase as well as to
decrease the amount of marital obligations in appropriate circumstances, while
modification by a bankruptcy court can only diminish the amount of support
available to the nonbankrupt spouse. Because support is by its nature a flexible
concept that can vary with the parties' fluctuating needs and abilities, present
circumstances are critically relevant in determining the nature of a marital debt.
Rather than adopting a present circumstances test, however, the bankruptcy
courts should defer dischargeability determinations to state courts. Application
of a federal bankruptcy test to dischargeability determinations in state courts
would authorize those courts to modify debts that they ordinarily might be pow-
erless to alter. Thus, reasonable debts that continue to function as support could
389. State divorce courts should consider reserving jurisdiction to award support in the limited
circumstance of a spouse being discharged of marital debts in a later bankruptcy. Alternatively,
legislatures could enact statutory provisions authorizing such awards, similar to California Civil
Code § 4812, and specify that such statutes apply even in the absence of an existing support award in
the original divorce decree. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
390. See Chrystler v. Heslar (In re Heslar), 16 Bankr. 329, 333 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981). The
court stated:
[State courts] handle divorces on a daily basis. The expertise of circuit judges in the family
law field extends not only to legal problems but also to the disciplines of psychology and
sociology. Specially trained personnel and the organization of the Court functions are
geared to the protection of the rights of not only the parties themselves but also those of the
children of the marriage and other family members.
Id.
391. The original divorce court may have heard evidence concerning a specific marital debt and
may have firsthand knowledge of the parties' settlement, placing that court in a potentially superior
position to determine the parties' intent. In re Marriage of Sailsbury, 13 Kan. App. 2d 740, 744, 779
P.2d 878, 881 (1989).
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be protected from discharge, while those that have become entirely unreasonable
because of changed circumstances could be reduced to a more moderate sum.
Because of the inextricable interrelationship between support and property
division, the ideal solution is for Congress to eliminate the distinction from the
Bankruptcy Code entirely.3 92 Absent such a remedy, the bankruptcy courts
should abstain from delving into the nature of disputed marital debts and defer
to the more appropriate forum of the state courts. To avoid delay and continued
uncertainty, the state court dischargeability determination should occur before
the bankruptcy action is concluded.
Marital debts presumptively should be categorized as support; the fact that
a debt to a former spouse arose from a divorce decree or settlement agreement
should be prima facie evidence that the debt falls within the exception to dis-
charge.393 If a debtor was unable to persuade the court that the debt had be-
come inequitable and unreasonable, the court would not discharge the debt in
full or in part.394 Thus, dischargeability determinations would need to be made
only in extreme cases, and a debtor who failed to litigate the issue would be
barred from raising the defense of discharge in a future enforcement action.
Furthermore, the federal courts must adopt a broader view of the exception
from discharge. Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts not only
debts that function as "support," but also those in the nature of "alimony."
Contemporary divorce law recognizes new forms of alimony intended to com-
pensate spouses for tangible and intangible contributions to the education and
career enhancement of the other spouse and, in some cases, for the contributing
392. When it enacted the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Congress specifically rejected pro-
posals to eliminate the distinction between support and property division. Senate Debate on Com-
promise Bill, 124 CONG. REc. 33,989-34,019 (1978); id. at 32,416-17; id. at 34,016-17. Rep. Henry
Hyde (R-Ill.) recently has sponsored a bill to amend the Bankruptcy Code "to make nondischarge-
able debts for liabilities under the terms of a property settlement agreement entered into in connec-
tion with a separation agreement or divorce decree." H.R. 5203, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG.
REc. (1990).
393. Bankruptcy Rule 4005 states that "[alt the trial on a complaint objecting to a discharge, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the objection." The rule has been applied to exceptions from
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). See, eg., Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d
1103 (6th Cir. 1983); Davidson v. Davidson (In re Davidson), 104 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1989); Altavilla v. Altavilla (In re Altavilla), 40 Bankr. 938 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). However, the
rule allows the courts to set their own standard of proof. Although in most bankruptcy proceedings
the courts have adopted a clear and convincing standard, they have been more lenient in proceedings
under § 523(a)(5). See Davidson, 104 Bankr. at 798 (preponderance of the evidence standard im-
posed); Wickman Machine Tools, Inc. v. Bradford (In re Bradford), 22 Bankr. 899, 901 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1982); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 8, at 29. Some courts have allowed the burden of
proof to shift to the debtor upon presentation of a prima facie case. See Newkirk v. Thomas (In re
Thomas), 21 Bankr. 571, 573 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Daviau v. Daviau (In re Daviau), 16 Bankr.
421,424 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). This procedure, however, has been criticized. See Melichar v. Ost,
7 Bankr. 951, 963 (D. Md. 1980); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 8, at 29. Nonetheless, the courts do
have a certain amount of discretionary power to make the case easier for the objector, as indicated in
the Advisory Committee Note for rule 4005:
Subject to the allocation by the rule of the initial burden of producing evidence and the
ultimate burden of persuasion, the rule leaves to the courts the formulation of rules gov-
erning the shift of the burden of going forward with the evidence in the light of considera-
tions such as the difficulty of proving the nonexistence of a fact and of establishing a fact as
to which the evidence is likely to be more accessible to the debtor than to the objector.
39,4. The presumption should be particularly strong when the bankruptcy occurs within a short
time after the divorce.
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spouse's own lost opportunity.395 These awards, usually for a definite sum and
not terminable upon contingencies such as death or remarriage, almost always
resemble property division in form and, therefore, are commonly discharged in
bankruptcy. When bankruptcy courts misinterpret substituted forms of alimony
and support, the result frustrates policies behind state divorce law. Recognition
of these unique awards as a form of alimony will preserve such debts and allow
the recipient spouse to achieve the post-marital fresh start intended by state di-
vorce courts.
In determining the nature of marital debts for bankruptcy purposes, state
courts should be afforded the option of considering the parties' present circum-
stances. But those courts should do so with caution and restraint. Not uncom-
monly, financial awards to dependent and custodial spouses are woefully
inadequate from the start.39 6 Placing too much weight on the debtor's present
financial circumstances can impoverish the former spouse and children, granting
the debtor an unfair and unjustified head start. Conversely, when the former
spouse prospers while the debtor's own position substantially declines, if unrea-
sonable marital debts are not discharged, his bankruptcy action yields him noth-
ing but an illusory false start. State courts should be permitted to determine
both the significance of the parties' present circumstances and the strength of
their own policies of affording certainty and stability to divorce decrees. Only
by engaging the state courts in bankruptcy matters that extend into traditional
family law issues will an appropriate balance be achieved.
395. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
396. The disastrous economic effect of divorce on women and children has been the subject of
numerous studies for the past two decades. See, eg., L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICAN (1985); Espenshade, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
COUNSELING 615 (1979); Hoffman, Marital Instability and the Economic Status of Women, 14 DE-
MOGRAPHY 67 (1977); Weitzman, supra note 20.
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